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ABSTRACT
THE IDENTIFICATION OF OBJECTS IN SCENES:
THE ROLE OF SCENE BACKGROUNDS IN OBJECT NAMING
FEBRUARY, 1990

SUSAN J. BOYCE, B.S., URSINUS COLLEGE
M.S., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

Directed by

:

Professor Alexander Pollatsek

The purpose of this research was to investigate the
role of scene backgrounds on object identification.

Previous research with brief presentation of scenes

indicated that scene context facilitated object
identification.

Experiment

longer display durations.

1

replicated this finding with

Experiments

2

and

3

were designed

to investigate the time course of background information

acquisition using an eye movement paradigm.
results from Experiment

2

Although the

were inconclusive, Experiment

3

demonstrated that scene background information was acquired
on both the first and second fixations on a scene.

It was

concluded that background information acquired from the
first and second fixations facilitates object

identification.
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CHAPTER

1

INTRODUCTION

Understanding the process of object identification is
essential for our understanding of both human visual

processing capabilities and our understanding of the
organization of human memory.

The human ability to

transform light falling on to the retina into meaningful
information is an amazing capability that we accomplish

effortlessly and without awareness.

However, the cognitive

processes involved in making sense of our visual world are
complex and currently not very well understood.
On a broad level, the purpose of this dissertation is
to add to our knowledge of the cognitive processes involved
in human visual information processing.

Object recognition

is just one of the tasks our visual system accomplishes.

It

has been chosen for study primarily because it is a

definable task.

That is, operationally we can define object

recognition as having a beginning (when light reflected off
the object falls onto the retina) and an end (when

information stored in memory about that object has been
accessed)

Much of the research on object identification has
focused on the issue of whether recognition is the result of
independently
a bottom-up perceptual analysis that proceeds

recognition
of other cognitive processes or whether object
in memory to
is highly dependent on world knowledge stored

aid the perceptual processes.

This is an important first

step to understanding visual processing because by

determining what information is used in object
identification we can begin to outline how the process is

carried out.
There are many different ways to investigate the

process of object identification.

One obvious way is to

study how people recognize single objects in isolation,

realizing that this is a somewhat artificial situation.
Objects in the real world do not appear isolated but instead
occur as part of much more complicated "scenes".

However,

it is thought that if we can explain the process of the

identification of a single object in isolation then

explaining object identification under more naturalistic
settings should follow logically.

That is, the basic

processes involved in object recognition should be the same

whether or not the object is located in a scene context.
On the other hand, the process of object identification

may proceed very differently when an object is a part of a
more naturalistic scene than when it is in isolation.
is,

That

something about the scene information itself may play

role in the object identification process.

a

If this were the

case, then studying the process of object identification

with isolated objects may never bring us closer to the goal
of more generally understanding human visual information

processing.

2

Overview

The rest of this chapter is devoted to a review of what
we currently know about object identification and how scene

context affects the process of object identification.

The

first section contains a review of a recent model of object

recognition proposed by Biederman (1987)

.

The model that he

puts forth is a bottom-up account of object recognition that
is based upon the idea that to recognize an object one must

first recognize the component parts of an object.

I

believe

this model to be the state-of-the-art in modelling the
Much about the model is

object recognition process.

untested and, in fact, may be untestable, however,

I

think

it is important to include because it provides some insight

into where we currently are in our understanding of object

recognition.

The second section of this chapter deals

with the literature on object recognition in scene context.
The general purpose of all this research was to determine

whether scene context plays a role in the identification of
objects.

A Model of Object Recognition
The most recent and most comprehensive model of object

recognition has been put forth by Biederman (1987).

The

basic idea behind his Recognition-by-Components (RBC) model
of the
is that objects are recognized by the identification

component "parts" of the object.

Biederman 's model begins

a
describing the process of object identification after

3

stage of edge extraction has already been completed.

At the

level in visual processing where his model begins, the

representation is very much like a line drawing of an
object.

The first stage in his model is the segmentation of

the object into its component parts.

This segmentation is

accomplished by an algorithm that does not depend on
knowledge about the object's identity, but instead relies
only on the information available in the edge-based

representation.

The resulting parts are then matched

against a set of primitive shapes stored in memory.

This

results in a description of the object's shape in terms of
this constrained set of primatives.

Finally, this

representation is matched against information in memory
about the object's identity.
In some respects, this model is like the old feature

models of letter recognition (e.g. Selfridge and Neisser,
1960)

.

Both depend on a componential form of analysis.

That is, the entire stimulus is not recognized as a whole.
Instead it is broken up into features, or parts, that are

identified first and this leads to the recognition of the
whole.

The advantage of this kind of model over a template

model is that it attempts to define in a constrained way

what sort of information is stored in memory and how the

matching occurs between incoming visual information and
stored information in memory.

Biederman (1987) claims that

limited
all objects are composed of some combination of a
geons)
set of volumetric shapes (his name for these is
4

.

Th(

.

identity of an object is defined by which particular

volumetric primitives it is made of and the spatial
relations of these components to one another.
a coffee mug is made up of two geons,

For example,

a cylinder geon

(makes

the cup part) and a curved cylinder (which makes the
handle)

The part of the model that is least well defined is

exactly how these relations between the geons become
specified.

That is, a coffee mug is not the only object

made up of a straight cylinder geon and a curved cylinder
geon.

These same geons define the shape of a bucket.

Biederman and others (Rock, 1983, for example) propose that
a structural description is formed that specifies the

relations between the parts.

Thus, the structural

description for the coffee mug would differ from that of the
bucket in the way in which the geons were attached together.
So far, Biederman has not specified how this structural

description is formed.

Nor has he clearly defined whether a

structural description is like a map (spatially organized)
or some kind of list of propositions.

For all of its problems, Biederman 's model is probably
one of the most detailed models of object recognition to
date.

Perhaps the best aspect of his model is that he has

precisely defined an algorithm that segments an object into
constituent parts that only relies on the visual input.

The

parts that result of this segmentation algorithm correspond
should be
well with our phenomonological impression of what

5

a part

(dividing a coffee cup into the cup part and the

handle part, for example)

.

Furthermore, there is some

behavioral evidence to suggest that when the information
that serves as input to the algorithm is missing from an
object, identification is extremely difficult or impossible

(Biederman and Blickle, 1985)

.

Also, his explanation of

exactly how the parts are fitted by the appropriate geon is
fairly detailed and depends only upon the information

contained within a two-dimensional "line-drawing like"
representation.

Perhaps the knottiest problem with the RBC model lies
in testing the validity of these shape primitives; geons.

After the object has been segmented into its constituent
parts, the resulting part is compared to the set of 36

primitives.

The nearest match will then be used to describe

the shape of that region of the object.

This "nearest

match" situation makes it impossible to really test whether
he has properly defined the set of visual primitives,

because in his definition everything will be "fit" by one of
the geons to some approximation.

Thus, there really is no

such thing as a part that is not a geon and this makes this

aspect of the model somewhat untestable.
Overall, however, Biederman has begun to outline a

framework of object recognition which is detailed enough to

make a number of predictions and advance our knowledge about
the object recognition process.

The problems with the model

that
are that the definition of "geon" is sufficiently vague

structural
it may not be useful and the concept of the
6

description is still left very unclear.

But the bottom-up

nature of this model has some appeal.

Validity of the Edge Based Approach
The point must be made that the RBC model rests on the

assumption that perceptual analysis is preceded by an edge
detection process (i.e. that further processing of an image
proceeds on a representation that is virtually a line
drawing, no matter what the input was like)

.

Thus,

information about color and texture (surface
characteristics) plays no role in the initial processing of

the stimulus.

Information about the surface characteristics

does not in any way affect the initial access to the memory

representation for that object under most normal situations.
It could be argued that this assumption is self-serving.

That is, it is much easier to do this kind of research with
line drawings as opposed to color photographs, so hence the

assumption.
In fact, there does exist some data that would argue

that surface characteristics cannot be ignored in models of

object recognition.

Ostergaard and Davidoff (1985)

presented subjects with photographs of fruits and vegetables
The photographs were either

in their first experiment.

black and white or in color and the subjects had to name the
object. They found a significant advantage in object naming

times when the objects were presented in color over black
and white.

In a second experiment they tested whether this

7

.

advantage for color photographs would occur in an object

recognition task, as well as a naming task.

They wanted to

hold color constant so they used three stimuli that had a
similar color (tomato, radish and strawberry) and

photographed them in color, in black and white, and then, in
order to test the effect of the inappropriate color, they
spray painted the objects blue and took color photographs.
One group of subjects named the objects as before.

For a

second group of subjects, a target object was specified (the

radish for example) and they were to respond yes/no on each
trial as to whether it was the radish.

They again found an

advantage in naming time for color photographs (the correct
color) over black and white.

(They found no difference

between the black and white trials and the blue trials)
However, this advantage for correct color slides did not

exist on the recognition task.

Thus, they conclude that

color facilitates object naming, but not object recognition.

There are aspects of this study that do not seem quite
right.

First of all, it could be the case that there are

classes of objects in which color is important for
identification.

The objects chosen by Ostergaard and

Davidoff seem to fall into that category.

Many fruits and

vegetables are similar in terms of their shapes and
therefore it must be something about their surface
characteristics that distinguish them.

So they may have

stacked the deck to get color effects by the choice of their
stimuli.

Secondly,

I

find it surprising that if color is so

for
important, that they did not get an interference effect
8

objects that are the inappropriate color (blue strawberry,
for example)

.

This could be because there was such a

limited set of objects (three, shown for hundreds of trials)
and that the same inappropriate color was used for each
object.

Biederman and Ju (1988) conducted their own study to

determine whether color of an object really is important to
the identification process.

They presented subjects with

line drawings of objects or color photographs of the same

objects and recorded both naming times and recognition times
as did Ostergaard and Davidoff (1985)

.

They found no

difference in either measure (naming or recognition) between
the color photographs and the line drawings.

They then went

back and classified their objects as having a diagnostic
color or not using the rationale that, perhaps for some
classes of objects, color is more important.

They performed

an items analysis on the basis of this sorting and still

found no advantage for color photographs.

From this they

conclude that color information is not important for the
first contact with the memory representation, and that only

later on in the process should color/surface information be
registered.

Their diagnostic/non-diagnostic color distinction is
not terribly impressive.

The examples of objects with

diagnostic color are banana, fork, fish and camera as
opposed to chair, pen, mitten and bicycle pump for non

diagnosticity of color.

It seems as though there are other

9

objects that would be better candidates for the diagnostic

color category, such as orange, apple, leopard, tiger, etc.
However, Biederman does concede that there may be classes of

objects where the only distinguishing features between the

members are their surface characteristics, and he proposes
that identification of these objects would take longer.
The issue of whether the identification of line

drawings is exactly the same as identification of more

naturally represented objects is obviously not one that has
been settled.

On some level it is hard to believe that

surface characteristics, such as color and texture, play no
role in object identification.

On the other hand, the

behavioral evidence collected on this issue seems mixed.
The research conducted as part of this dissertation used
line drawings of objects and scenes as stimuli.

The

decision to use line drawings as representations of objects
and scenes in the real world was made for two reasons:

a)

since it is not clear that the perception of photographs is

qualitatively different than the perception of line drawings
and b) working with line drawings allows the experimenter

much more control over the stimulus display.
Biederman 's RBC model, as it currently stands, accounts
for the process of object recognition without calling upon

world knowledge to supplement the perceptual processes.

He

has outlined a framework of recognition that is dependent

only on the information contained within a two-dimensional

representation of the visual stimulus.

In the following

section evidence will be reviewed that suggests that context
10

plays an important role in object recognition.

Biederman

'

s

Although

RBC model currently does not indicate the role

of scene context on object identification it could easily be

adapted to incorporate scene context effects.
The Role of Scene Context in Object Identification

Much of the research in picture perception has focused
on the issue of how context affects the object

identification process.

It is presumed that by studying the

situations where object identification is speeded or
impaired we might gain a better understanding of the

processes involved in identifying objects in the natural
world.
It has been repeatedly demonstrated that objects

located in a coherent scene context are identified more

accurately than objects located in an incoherent scene
context (Antes, 1974; Antes, 1977; Antes and Mann, 1984;

Antes and Penland, 1981; Antes, Penland and Metzger, 1981;
Biederman, 1972; Biederman, 1981; Biederman, Mezzanotte and

Rabinowitz, 1982;

Biederman, Rabinowitz, Glass and Stacy,

1974; Boyce, Pollatsek and Rayner, 1989; Friedman,

Loftus and Mackworth, 1978)

.

1979;

A number of theories have been

developed to explain this phenomenon.

The basic idea behind

these theories is that something about the scene context

facilitates the initial contact with a memory representation
for the target object.

The two important aspects of these

theories are the locus of the scene context effects (that

11

is, what in the scene is actually doing the facilitating)

and the mechanism of facilitation (how the facilitation
happens)

•

will begin with a discussion of the literature

I

concerning the locus of scene context effects and then deal
with the issue of mechanism.
Locus of Scene Context Effects

Something present in the scene context must be
responsible for the more rapid identification of objects
located in coherent scenes.

In order to investigate which

aspects of a coherent scene are important one must know what

makes a scene seem coherent.

Biederman, Mezzanotte and

Rabinowitz (1982) attempted to define scene coherence as the

relationships between the objects in a scene.

They proposed

that a scene could be considered coherent if all the objects

obeyed the following principles of relationships:

Probability

-

an object is likely to occur in the context;

Size - an object is in correct proportion to the rest of the
scene; Position - an object is in the correct location in

the scene; Support - an object appears to obey the laws of
- an

gravity and; Interposition

opaque object occludes what

is behind it.

Biederman et al.

(1982)

presented scenes for 150 ms and

measured percent correct on an object identification task.
They found that an object violating one or more of these

relation principles was harder to identify than the same
object without a violation.

Biederman et al. suggested that

scene context effects were due to these relationships
12

between the objects.

That is, early in scene viewing these

relationships are identified and through the extraction of
these relationships, appropriate memory structures are

activated and the object identification process is
facilitated.

This argument, however, is circular.

If accessing this

relational information facilitates one's ability to identify
a

target object, then it must come before the object has

been identified.

But all of these relations seem to be

dependent on first knowing the identity of the object.
is,

That

how can you know that a sofa does not belong in the

street scene, unless you have already identified the context
and, more importantly, that the object in question is a sofa

and not a truck?

Biederman at al. counter that some of the relations are
dependent on knowing the identity of the object
(probability, position and size) while others can be

accessed without knowing the meaning of the object (support,
interposition)

.

His argument is that one may know that an

object is lacking support, such as a sofa floating in midair,

from a low level parsing of the background that

indicates that the sofa is not resting on

a

solid surface

and that this parsing stage occurs very early in the

processing of the scene (before you have identified the
object)

.

Parsing, in this context refers to the assignment

to
of line segments as belonging to an object or belonging

some other entity in the scene.

13

However, even if one can

determine that an object lacks support in the scene very
early in processing, one still has to know that it is a sofa
to realize that it is violating a relation because some

objects do not require support (e.g. airplanes).

Therefore,

it is not clear that these scene relations defined by

Biederman et al., can be accessed prior to the identity of
objects in the scene.
Loftus and Mackworth (1978) claimed that something

about the global meaning of the scene or "gist" is important
in facilitating the processing of the objects, using as

evidence where people chose to look in a scene.

They

monitored eye movements while subjects viewed scenes for
seconds each.

4

Some of the scenes contained objects that

were very unlikely to occur given the scene context (i.e.
octopus in a farm background, tractor in an underwater
background)

.

They found that low probability objects were

fixated earlier, were fixated more often, and were fixated
for longer durations.

From these data Loftus and Mackworth

claimed that subjects readily obtain the "gist" of the scene
(within the first fixation) and partially identify objects
in the periphery.

This partial object identification then

leads subjects to compute the probabilities that these

objects are likely to occur given the gist and the eye is

guided to the low probability objects first.
Loftus' model places a lot of importance on the first

fixation on the scene.

In his view,

it seems as though most

of the processing required to understand the scene is

conducted in the first 150 ms.
14

Even the objects are

"partially" identified.

This is a claim that will be

addressed later in the paper.

A second problem with Loftus»

model is his dependence on fixation duration as a dependent
measure.

It could be that subjects fixated the octopus

longer in the farm context because it was interesting or
anomalous.

That is, subjects could have identified the

octopus as rapidly in the farm scene as in the underwater
scene, but were having problems making sense of the scene.

Loftus' results cannot distinguish between these two

explanations.

Furthermore, subjects might have seen their

task as "finding the strange object" and this led to the
target object being fixated early in scene viewing.
Boyce, Pollatsek and Rayner (1989) conducted a series
of experiments in an attempt to be more diagnostic about

what aspects of scene context facilitate object
identification.

They reasoned that

a

scene could be thought

of as a background and a collection of objects.

Objects

were defined as small closed figures that subtended

approximately two degrees of visual angle and had the

characteristic that they were "movable" entities.

That is,

they were things that could be moved around in the real

world (for example, a toaster).

A "background" was defined

as a large entity, taking up most of the visual field

(approximately 15 degrees) and had the characteristic of
That is, any small region of the

being locally meaningless.

background would not convey the meaning of the background.
The visual information that contained the meaning was

15

distributed over almost the entire visual field.

Boyce et

al. were interested in the role of scene backgrounds in

object identification.

In the first experiment objects were

located either in a consistent background (bedroom objects
in bedroom background)

,

in an inconsistent background

(bedroom objects in refrigerator background) or in no

background (see figure

1)

.

Subjects were first presented

with a the name of a target object.

The scene then appeared

for 150 ms followed by a pattern mask consisting of randomly

placed line segments and angles.

A filled circle located

within the pattern mask served as a location cue indicating
the possible position of the target object.

Subjects were

to respond 'yes' or 'no' as to whether the target named at

the beginning of the trial was present at the cued location.

This paradigm was exactly the same as Biederman's (1982).
The purpose of Boyce et al.'s research was to

a)

replicate

Biederman's context effect with the violation of probability
and b) to be more precise about the locus of this context

effect (i.e. scene backgrounds instead of object relations).
Subjects were more accurate at identifying objects in
the consistent backgrounds than in the inconsistent

backgrounds.

However, subjects were equally accurate in the

consistent backgrounds and the no background control.
Hence, context affected performance, but the effect appeared
to be interference from the inconsistent backgrounds rather

than facilitation from the consistent backgrounds.
The second experiment attempted to determine the

relative contributions of backgrounds and non-target objects
16

on target object identification using the same task.

Experiment

1,

In

every scene was made up of five objects that

belonged together in a scene (e.g. bedroom objects) and only
the consistency of the background with this object set was

manipulated.

In the second experiment, both the consistency

of the background (with respect to the target object) and

the consistency of the cohort (non-target) objects were

independently varied.

The results indicated that there was

no effect of cohort consistency.

That is, all of the effect

of context observed in the first experiment was due to the

degree of background consistency and the cohort objects

contributed nothing.
The third experiment was designed to determine whether

the observed effects of context were due to consistent

backgrounds facilitating object identification or
inconsistent background interfering with object
identification.

In Experiment

1

performance with the

consistent backgrounds was equal to performance with the no

background controls.

Thus it appeared as though

inconsistent backgrounds interfered with object
identification.

However, it could have been the case that

performance was relatively good in the no background
controls for a different reason than that producing the good

performance in the Consistent Background condition.
is,

That

perhaps the good performance in the No Background

controls was because these scenes were less visually complex
than the scenes with backgrounds.

17

In order to test this

hypothesis, nonsense backgrounds were created that consisted
of approximately the same number of line segments as the

backgrounds, but conveyed no meaning. Experiment

replication of Experiment

1

3

was a

with the nonsense backgrounds in

place of the no background controls.

The results indicated

that consistent backgrounds facilitated object

identification while inconsistent backgrounds did not
interfere.

These experiments, taken as a whole, seem to indicate
that background information, as defined by Boyce et al. is

responsible for the scene context effects, while cohort
objects in the scene have no effect on the identification of
the target object.

However, other research exists that

indicates that cohort objects in the scene may play an
important role in facilitating object identification.

Friedman (1979) proposed that some objects in scenes

may be responsible for facilitating further object
identification.

She argued that some objects are obligatory

given the scene context (e.g. refrigerator in kitchen scene)

while other objects are non-obligatory (e.g. plant in
kitchen scene)

.

Obligatory objects may provide access to

memory for similar scenes which should facilitate further
scene processing.

Although she did not collect data to

directly test the role of obligatory objects as a source of
context effects, she has evidence for the distinction

between obligatory and non-obligatory objects.

Friedman

recorded eye movements while subjects viewed scenes in

preparation for a recognition memory test.
18

She found that

first fixation durations were shortest on obligatory objects
and were longest on unexpected objects that did not fit in

the scene at all.

First fixations on non-obligatory objects

were of intermediate duration.

A second source of support for objects as the locus of
scene context effects comes from Henderson, Pollatsek and

Rayner (1987)

.

They proposed that objects might facilitate

one another in scene context due to the semantic

relationships between objects likely to occur in the same
scene.

They presented subjects with two objects that were

to be fixated sequentially and recorded eye movement times
and time to name the second object.

They found that

fixating a related object prior to the target object

facilitated naming time for the target object.

Thus,

fixating a picture of a doctor before fixating a picture of
a nurse facilitated the time to say "nurse".

However, these

objects were not located in scenes, but as isolated objects

without context.

Thus it is unclear how this relates to

research on scenes.
Conclusions about the locus of scene context effects
are hard to draw from the above review.

Boyce et al. have

evidence that global information gained from scene

backgrounds is an important source of contextual information
and that cohort objects provide little, whereas data from

Henderson et al. indicate that object information may also
serve as the locus of context effects.

These findings may

not be quite as contradictory as they first seem.
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The

methodologies employed were quite different (this will be
discussed in more detail later) and it is possible that both
object and global background information play a role in
scene context effects.

Mechanism of Facilitation
Two opposing theories exist about the mechanism of
scene context effects.

One theory, put forth by Biederman

(1982), Friedman (1979), and others (Antes et al.,

1981;

Loftus, 1983) holds that a schema or frame for the

particular scene is accessed early in scene viewing.

The

second theory holds that a much simpler priming mechanism
can account for scene context effects (Henderson et al.,
1987)

.

What is a schema?

.

The typical definition given in

response to this question is that a schema is a

hierarchically organized memory structure.
is accurate but fairly abstract.

This definition

All the knowledge of the

world that we have must be organized in our memory in some
way.

When presented with a concept such as "kitchen", we

are able to access lots of information related to that

concept fairly easily.

We know that a kitchen is a room in

the house generally used for cooking.

Also, we know that

utensils to accomplish this task (pots and pans, coffee
makers, spoons, etc.) are all likely to occur in the

kitchen.

We know that stoves and refrigerators occur in

kitchens and generally don't occur in other rooms of the

20

house and so on.

A schema is one way to think about how

this information is organized.

That is, information that is

relevant to a particular concept is bundled together so that

activating one concept makes it easier to access the
concepts that are bundled with it.
One thing that makes schemas different from other

organizations of memory (semantic networks, for example) has
to do with what particular concepts are grouped together.

A

schema is organized around everyday events and scenes.

Concepts that typically co-occur in an event or scene will
be grouped together.

Thus the basis of organization is

"episodic" knowledge, not abstract, semantic knowledge.

A second characteristic of schemas is their

hierarchical organization.

This means that concepts that

are episodically related but at different levels in category

membership are organized such that more basic level concepts
are grouped under higher order concepts.

Thus,

"bedroom"

might be the top concept representation with objects that
are likely to occur in a bedroom represented at a lower
level and connected to the "bedroom" node.
A third characteristic of schemas is that for any

particular concept there exists

a

default value.

That is,

when you read the word "spoon" probably the spoon that comes
to mind is not a serving spoon or soup spoon, but the

ordinary metal dinner spoon.

That is, contained within the

schema organization is also the information about which

subordinate concepts are most frequent.
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A scene schema is knowledge about a place that is

organized in the manner outlined above.

The superordinate

concept usually is thought of as corresponding to the
setting, such as "kitchen".

Grouped under this concept are

the representations for objects that are likely to occur in
the scene and each object is also represented by its own
schema.

When one of the concepts in this structure becomes

activated, this activation is spread to the other concepts

that are connected to the activated node.
The critical difference between the schema organization
and a semantic network, for the purposes of the current
research, has to do with whether the relationships between

the concepts are based upon episodic or semantic

associations.

Schemas predict that concepts that co-occur

in the world are connected in memory.

That is, the

connections between representations in memory directly
reflect our experiences in the world.

Semantic networks, on

the other hand, are organized around more generalized,

abstracted knowledge and category structures.
To summarize, a schema is a possible organization of
The general principles that

world knowledge in memory.
define a schema are

a)

concepts that co-occur in scenes and

events in the real world are connected in memory,

b)

concepts are represented at many levels of specificity and

arranged hierarchically, and

c)

there exists default values

that usually represent the most common instantiation of the
concept.
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One final aspect of schema organization that is often

included in the definition of schema is that schemas also

contain information about the preferred spatial locations of
objects within scenes.
al.,

1982)

It has been proposed (Biederman et

that somehow information about the spatial

position of an object is contained in the connection between
the object representation and the superordinate

representation.

There is no clear discussion in the

literature as to how this information is represented in the
schema.

Since this aspect of schema organization is not

very well understood and the experiments reported in this
paper do not directly test the issue of spatial locations in
schemas,

I

will not consider it further.

Schemas and Context Effects

.

If schemas are to be of

value in accounting for the fact that scene context
facilitates object identification, then one must explain how
a

particular schema gets activated and how this facilitates

the process of identification.

One possibility is that

identification of global contextual information makes the
first contact with the schema for that scene.

Once the

superordinate concept for the scene has been activated, the
rest of the concepts grouped together in the schema for that

scene become partially activated.
al.

(1989)

The data from Boyce et

and from Loftus and Mackworth (1978) would argue

that global scene context activates the appropriate schema.

A different route to schema activation has been proposed by

Friedman (1979).

She suggests that the identification of an
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obligatory object in the scene accesses the correct schema,

which then speeds up the identification of the remaining
objects.

Both of these routes to schema activation could be
correct.

That is, it may not matter what aspect of the

scene is identified first, whether it is the scene

background or a particular key object.

The important

finding is that something about having an object in a scene
seems to facilitate object identification and this

facilitation may be accomplished by way of activating the

appropriate scene schema.
Object to Object Priming
A very different mechanism of facilitation has been

proposed by Henderson et al.

(1987).

They argued that

facilitation occurs between related objects by a process of
automatic, spreading activation, whereby objects in a scene

that are related semantically or associatively facilitate
one another.

The difference between this view and that put

forth by the schema theorists is the prediction of what

should facilitate what.

That is, if objects are connected

to one another in a pre-existing semantic network as

proposed by Henderson et al. and facilitation is the result
of spreading activation through this network, then it is

unclear how higher-order conceptual information can produce
facilitation in object identification.

In this scheme,

context effects can only occur from activating a close

neighbor of a particular object in the network.
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The

advantage of this theory is that it makes much clearer

predictions concerning which objects should prime each
other.

Objects that are semantically related, such as

"coat" and "hat" should facilitate one another.

Also,

objects that are strong associates of one another should

result in facilitation, such as "doctor" and "nurse".
However, the validity of object to object priming as a

theoretical explanation of scene context effects rests on
its ability to explain facilitation effects found with

normal scenes.

The assumption is that objects that are

strong associates of one another or are semantically related
are commonly' found in the same scene.

coats and hats can appear in

a

While it is true that

scene together,

I

would argue

that there is a different level of relationship between

objects in most scenes.

episodically related

,

Many objects in scenes are

meaning that they can co-occur given

the setting information but a priori would not be strongly

related to one another.

For example, both a teddy bear and

a suitcase could appear in a scene sitting on a bed.

These

objects can co-occur in the bedroom scene, yet they are not

semantically or associatively related.
To summarize, work on scene context effects has focused
on the issue of what in the scene is responsible for the

facilitation of object identification and how this

facilitation occurs.

The research conducted by Boyce et al.

(1989), Loftus and Mackworth (1978), Friedman (1979) and

Biederman et al.

(1982)

argues that a schema for the scene
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is activated early in scene viewing and this
facilitates

further scene processing.

There is little agreement or

specificity concerning what aspects of the scene are
responsible for this facilitation.

However, much of the

evidence indicates that global information about the setting
of the scene may be at least partly responsible.

Methodological Problems with the Previous Research
Most of the research discussed in the previous section
has been conducted with either brief presentation using

accuracy as the primary measure or with eye movement

monitoring techniques.

The rationale behind the brief

presentation is to simulate the first fixation on a scene.
The durations of the display in this research range from 100
to 200 ms.

This is approximately the length of first

fixations on scenes when not presented tachistoscopically
(Loftus,

1983).

There are two possible problems with brief presentation
research.

First, one could argue that this methodology may

overestimate the effect of context during normal scene
viewing.

When a scene is presented for 100-200 ms, subjects

do not have time to identify all of the scene elements.

In

the cases where the subject has not identified the target

object during the scene exposure, the presence/identity of
the target object may be inferred from what the subject

knows is likely to occur, given his world knowledge and some

partial scene information.
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Second, it is possible that brief presentations are not

appropriate simulations of one fixation on a scene.

It

could be that subjects employ attentional strategies with tscope displays that they would not use in normal scene
viewing.

When the scene is presented for 100 ms and the

subjects have no idea where the critical region of the

picture is prior to the trial, they may try to diffuse their

attention over the entire visual field.

This strategy could

be beneficial, since some information should be obtained

from most regions of the scene which may outweigh the cost
of not processing any one location of the scene very well.

However, this same strategy may not be so beneficial when

the viewing time is longer and there is not such a pressing

need to process all areas of the scene at once.
The other paradigm used in this research has been eye

movement monitoring.

Typically this is done while subjects

view scenes for longer durations (approximately 2-10
seconds)

.

Commonly, subjects are instructed that there will

be a recognition memory test for the pictures.

The

dependent variables of interest are fixation duration and
fixation location.

It is thought that subjects will fixate

informative regions of the scene early and that fixation

duration will reflect object identification time.
also some problems with this technique.

There are

First, studying a

picture for a later recognition memory test may be very

different than other types of viewing.

It is possible that

subjects pay more attention to small details of

a

they would if a different task had been employed.

scene than

The

second problem with this research is the validity of the

dependent measures.

Although fixation duration has been

demonstrated to be a correlate of word identification time
in reading (Blanchard,

1985; Rayner and Pollatsek,

situation could be different for pictures.

1987)

the

It is possible

that duration of a fixation on an object could primarily

reflect higher order factors such as subjects' interest in
the particular object rather than time to identify the
object.

The Current Methodology

The best way to investigate context effects on object

identification would be to allow subjects enough time to

view the scenes "normally" and use some measure of object
identification time besides fixation duration.

The

procedure used in the following experiments approximates
these requirements.

The basic idea is that subjects fixate

two locations in a scene, with the first fixation in the

center of the display and the second on a target object.
Object identification time is assessed by measuring the time
to name the target object. The procedure is similar to that

used by Henderson et al.
Collins,

(1984)

(1987), and Pollatsek, Rayner and

except that the objects were embedded in

normal scene context.

However, since there are many objects in a given scene,
a cue

must be given to indicate which object was the target

object.

Therefore, during the first fixation on the scene
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(in the center)

1/2 degree)

one of the objects is moved (approximately

and quickly returned to its original position.

This movement is easily perceived by the subjects and serves
as a location cue for the target object.

The subject's task

is to move his or her eyes to the target object and name it

as quickly as possible.

This procedure has some important advantages over tscope presentation.

Since the scene was present for as much

time as the subject needs to complete the task, there should

be no need for the subject to invoke atypical attentional
strategies.

Also, since the subject always has time to

fixate the target object there should be no need for the

subject to rely on context more in this task than in normal
scene viewing.

That is, subjects will not have to infer the

identity of the target object post-perceptually, since a
trial does not end until the subject has named the object.

The dependent measures

—

naming time, fixation

durations and fixation locations

—

together should be a

better reflection of object identification processes than
fixation duration alone, as has been previously used.

Time

to name an object seems a reasonable correlate of actual

identification time given current theories of object
recognition (Kroll and Potter, 1984; Theios and Amrhein,
1988)

.

It has been proposed that an object must be

identified conceptually in order to access the stored name,

whereas with words it is possible to produce the name

without necessarily contacting the meaning.
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.

The research reported in this paper was conducted to

further our understanding of the effect of scene context on

object identification.

The purpose of the first experiment

was to determine whether scene backgrounds facilitated
object identification with a different task.

That is, it

was of interest whether given good perceptual information

about the scene and the target object (i.e. longer viewing
duration, opportunity to fixate the target object) context

would still affect object identification.

This is important

since the bulk of experimental evidence for scene context

effects is from the t-scope paradigm.
The second and third experiments assessed the time

course of contextual information acquisition.

The

experiments tested whether context was processed
the first fixation on the scene,

fixation on the scene or
scene.

c)

b)

a)

only on

mostly on the second

during both fixations on the

Through an understanding of the time course of

contextual processing we can better understand the mechanism

by which context facilitates the object identification
process
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CHAPTER
EXPERIMENT

2

1

Introduction

The purpose of the first experiment was to determine

whether scene context affects object identification using a
more controlled methodology than has been previously
employed.

As mentioned in the introduction, there are a

number of reasons to question the body of literature on
context effects because of the methodology used.

Evidence

from tachistoscopic displays may overestimate context

effects and previous eye movement research with objects in

context may have used a contaminated dependent measure.
This experiment attempts to determine whether context

affects object identification when the methodological

problems are el iminated
Method

Subjects
Eight graduate and undergraduate students from the

University of Massachusetts participated in the experiment.
The subjects were paid $15 for their participation and the

experiment took

3

one-hour sessions.

Stimuli
There were 64 scenes used in the experiment, which were

constructed from an original set of 16 scenes.

These 16

scenes were line drawings of rooms of a house (e.g. bedroom
scene), common public places (e.g. diner/lunch counter), and

common outdoor scenes (e.g. street scene).
for a list and description of scenes)

.

(See Appendix

Each of the original

16 scenes consisted of a background and five objects that

belonged in the background.

These 16 scenes were modified

to create the Consistent Background scenes, the Inconsistent

Background scenes and the Nonsense Background scenes.
The original 16 Consistent scenes were organized in

8

scene pairs such that objects in both scenes in the pair

were roughly equivalent in real-world size.

The 16

Inconsistent Background scenes were created by switching
objects in one scene with objects in the paired scene.

The

placement of objects in the Inconsistent background was
subject to the requirement that the objects not appear

unsupported (which required rearranging the objects in many
cases)

.

In no case was the actual size of objects altered.

However, since the objects were in different locations in

the Consistent background and Inconsistent background

conditions, Nonsense Backgrounds were used to control for

the effects of this object relocation.

Nonsense backgrounds were created by distorting the
original backgrounds in order to delete the semantic

information contained in the background.

Distortions were

created with the following criteria in mind:

a)

nonsense

backgrounds should not look like the original backgrounds;
b)

subjects should not be able to name these backgrounds;
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c)

roughly the same number of lines and angles should be
employed in the nonsense background as in the original;

d)

and nonsense backgrounds should preserve a three dimensional
quality.

The nonsense backgrounds resulting from this set

of criteria did not appear as a random set of line segments,

but as a "coherent" background that lacked theme
information.

The three-dimensionality of the nonsense

backgrounds was preserved in order to provide planes on

which objects could be supported.

The objects were situated

in the nonsense backgrounds in exactly the same places as

they were in their matched meaningful background.

Thus, the

effects of distance from the fovea could be assessed

independently of semantic content of the background.

Each

original background had a nonsense background version.
The end result was 16 background consistent scenes, 16

background inconsistent scenes and two sets of nonsense
background scenes of 16 scenes each.

The two sets of

nonsense scenes were the result of placing objects in the
nonsense backgrounds to match the spatial locations of
consistent scenes and inconsistent scenes.

The scenes

subtended approximately 15 degrees visual angle and the
objects subtended approximately

2

degrees visual angle.

These stimuli were exactly the same as used by Boyce et al.
(1989), Experiment 3.

Design
Each subject named each target object in all four

background conditions (consistent, inconsistent and two

nonsense controls).

Each scene contained five objects, four

of which served as target objects to be named.

In each

scene, the object that was most difficult to name in a prior

pilot study was not included as a target object.

Thus,

in

the experiment, each of 64 target objects appeared in four
conditions, resulting in 256 trials.

Trials were presented

in a random order.

Apparatus
The scenes were displayed on a Megatek Whizzard vector

plotting CRT with a P-31 phosphor.
a VAX 11-730 computer.

This was interfaced with

Short vectors (under 1/4 degree

visual angle) were plotted in 1.2 microseconds per vector
and long vectors were plotted in 2.0 microseconds.

Total

plotting time for an average scene was under

Eye

4

ms.

movements were monitored with an SRI Generation V Dual
Purkinje eye tracker interfaced with the computer.

Naming

times were measured by a standard switch closure voice key
(Gerbrands)

.

Subjects' naming times, eye positions, and

fixation durations were collected and stored by the
computer.

Procedure
Subjects were initially shown the set of 64 target
objects, one at a time, in isolation, in order to establish

names for the objects.

A pilot study indicated that most

subjects used the same names for the objects.
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However,

subjects were allowed to use any name they felt comfortable
with, provided they were consistent across trials.

After

the naming practice, subjects placed their heads on a chin

rest in front of the CRT and their eye movements were

monitored.

When the experimenter determined that the eye

tracker was accurately monitoring the subjects' eye
position, the calibration sequence began.

Subjects

sequentially fixated crosses located on the left, right, top
and bottom of the screen.

After a successful calibration

had been achieved, subjects were given instructions about

their task. Ten practice trials preceded the experimental
trials in order to demonstrate the "wiggle" to the subject.

Different scenes and objects were used in the practice
trials than in the experimental trials.

A trial began with a fixation cross in the center of
the screen.

When the subject was seen to be fixating the

fixation cross, the experimenter began the trial.

The scene

After 75 ms. one of the objects

appeared on the screen.

moved 1/2 degree visual angle and returned to its original

position 75 ms later.

Subjects moved their eyes to the

"wiggled" object and named it as rapidly as possible and the

activation of the voice key terminated the display. The

experimenter recorded the response as correct or incorrect.
The experiment consisted of 256 trials separated into

blocks of 32 trials each.

8

A trial block took approximately

15 minutes to complete so the entire experiment spanned

three one hour sessions conducted on consecutive days.
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Subjects were given a

5

minute rest between blocks run on

the same day.
Eye Movement Reduction Criteria

Typically, eye movement researchers have used the term

"fixation" to refer to the period of time the eye is in a

stable position and the term "saccade" to refer to the

period of time the eye is in motion.

Use of these terms

implies that there is an unambigious criterion for the

determination of fixations and saccades in the eye movement
record.

However, this is not the case.

Some criterion must

be established to draw the line between the end of a

fixation and the beginning of

a saccade.

A variety of

different criteria have been used in the eye movement
literature.

In the current experiment, the eye was

considered in motion (saccade) if the position of the eye in
a given

millisecond was more than 1/2 degree visual angle

different than the average of the preceding

5 ms.

Thus,

small movements, under 1/2 degree, were not considered true

saccades and were included as part of the fixation duration.
Large movements, greater than 1/2 degree were considered
saccades.

Results and Discussion
The primary dependent measure was the time to name the

target object.

Eye movement data were collected primarily

to verify that subjects were performing the task as

instructed: that they began a trial fixating the center
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cross and then moved their eyes directly to the wiggled
object.

The eye movement data allows one to exclude trials

on which the subject did not move their eyes directly from
the center of the scene to the target object.

The eye

movement record also allows one to measure naming time in a
number of different ways.

Instead of measuring naming

latency from the beginning of the trial until the voice key

was activated, naming time may also be measured from the
time that the object was initially fixated until the

activation of the voice key. The data from the current
experiment was analyzed two ways: by taking the eye movement
data into account and also by ignoring the eye movement
data.

Both will be reported here.

Total Naming Time Analysis

The mean object naming latency of all correctly named

objects can be seen in the Table

1

below.

occurred on less than 1% of the trials.

Experiment

1

Naming errors
The primary goal of

was to assess the effect of background

information on object naming.

To this end, one might want

to compare the consistent background condition directly to

the inconsistent background condition.

However, since the

objects were in different locations in these two conditions,
the appropriate measure of the background effect is the

interaction between the meaningf ulness of the background and
the consistency of the background.

That is, since the

nonsense background conditions were matched to the
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experimental conditions for placement of the objects, a mor
appropriate comparisons are between the meaningful

background conditions and their matched nonsense background
conditions.

Table

1

Mean Object Naming Time Measured from the Beginning of the
Trial in Experiment

1

(in milliseconds)

Consistent
Background

Inconsistent
Background

Meaningful
Background

1082

1146

Nonsense
Background

1128

1125

-46

+21

Differences
Note

-

Includes all data except for naming errors.

No data

have been excluded due to the eye movement record.
The overall naming latency in the experiment was 112 0
ms.

As can be seen in Table

objects were named 46 ms

1,

faster in the Consistent Background condition than in the

matching Nonsense Background control condition and objects
in Inconsistent scenes were named 21 ms slower than objects

located in the matching Nonsense Background condition. The

interaction between Background Consistency and Background

Meaningfulness was significant, F(l,7) = 7.88, p

<

= 1152. There also was a significant main effect of

Consistency, F(l,7) = 31.64, p
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<

.001, MSE = 234.

.026, MSE

In order to evaluate whether the consistent
backgrounds

facilitated object identification and whether inconsistent

backgrounds interfered with identification of the target,
simple effects t-tests were computed for the differences

between the experimental conditions and their matching
controls.

Both the -46 ms difference between the Consistent

Background condition and its Nonsense Background control and
the 21 ms difference between the Inconsistent Background

condition and its Nonsense Background control were
significant, t(7) = -2.14, p
2.24, p < .05,

(s = 27),

<

.05,

(s = 61),

and t(7) =

respectively.

To summarize, when considering overall naming time from

the beginning of the trial until the object was named, there

was a significant effect of background consistency on object

naming relative to the nonsense background controls.
Furthermore, from this analysis it appears as though

consistent backgrounds facilitated object identification and
that inconsistent backgrounds interfered with the object

identification process.
Corrected Naming Time Analysis
Criteria for Excluding Trials.

The data included in

the following analyses are essentially the same as that

presented above, with the exception that some data were
excluded on the basis of the eye movements.

In order for a

trial to be included in these analyses, the subject must

have begun the trial fixating within
of the center fixation cross.
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1

degree visual angle

In addition, the eye must

have remained in this center region of the screen until
the
wiggle occurred and then the next fixation longer than 50 ms

must have been within
object.

The

1

1

degree of visual angle of the target

degree cut-off was chosen because it was

stringent enough to determine unambigiously that the subject
was fixating the target object (and the center of the scene
at the beginning of the trial) and not another object in the
scene, yet loose enough that trials were not excluded due to

minor errors in calibration.

The requirement that the eye

move directly from the center to the target object region

with only fixations of less than 50 ms in between was chosen
because it allowed no meaningful fixations on other objects
to intervene between the first fixation and the target

object fixation; however, it does not throw out trials in

which the subject blinked or there was a short temporary
track loss.
Corrected Overall Naming Time

.

The corrected overall

naming time data after the above cut-offs have been applied
can be seen in Table

2

.

The mean naming latency averaged

across conditions was 1109 ms.
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Table

2

Mean Overall Corrected Naming Time in Experiment

1

(in

milliseconds)
Consistent
Background

Inconsistent
Background

Meaningful
Background

1073

1129

Nonsense
Background

1117

1118

Note - Eliminating trials where the eye did not begin in the

center of the scene, remain in the center of the scene until
after the wiggle, or fixated some other aspect of the scene
for longer than 50 ms. before fixating the target object.

The difference between the Consistent Background

condition and its Nonsense Control was -44 ms and the

difference between the Inconsistent Background condition and
its matching Nonsense Background control was 11 ms.

interaction was significant F(l,7) = 5.60, p
1074.

<

This

.048, MSE =

There was also a significant main effect of

Background Consistency, F(l,7) = 11.3, p

<

.011, MSE = 562.

Simple effects t-tests were conducted to determine whether
the naming time in the Consistent Background condition was

significantly faster than in the Nonsense Background control
and whether the naming in the Inconsistent Background

condition was significantly slower than in its control
condition.

The difference between the Consistent Background

and the Nonsense Consistent condition was -44 ms, t(7) =
2.41, p < .025,

(s = 52)

and the difference between the

-

.

Inconsistent Background condition and its Nonsense

Background control was ii ms, t(7) = 1.28, p

>

.10.

Thus, the overall pattern of data from this analysis

looks similar to the uncorrected naming analysis with the

exception that in this analysis there is stronger evidence
for facilitation and weaker evidence for interference in

object naming caused by the inconsistent backgrounds.

Naming Time from Fixation of Target Object

.

Another

way to conceive of object naming latency would be to use the
time between when the object was actually fixated and when
it was named. The advantage of measuring naming time in this

manner is that it may more truly reflect the processing
required to identify the target object.

Table

3

displays

the mean object naming latency, measuring from when the

target was fixated to the end of the trial (triggering of
the voice key)
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Table

3

Mean Naming Time Measured from when Target Object
Fixated Until End of Trial in Experiment
Consistent
Background

iin milliseconds)

1

Inconsistent
Background

Meaningful
Background

751

814

Nonsense
Background

798

806

Differences

-47

+8

Mean overall naming latency in Table

3

is 792 ms.

The

critical interaction between Background Type (meaningful or
nonsense) and Background Consistency was significant, F(l,7)
= 6.17, p < .041, MSE = 984, as was the main effect of

consistency, F(l,7) = 19.6, p

<

.004, MSE = 517.

effects are consistent across items as well.

These

In an items

analysis the interaction was significant, F(l,63) = 6.44, p
<

.013,

as was the main effect of consistency, F(l,63) =

6.35, p < .014.

The difference between the Consistent Background

condition and its matching Nonsense Background control was
47 ms, which was significant, t(7)
52)

,

= -2.56, p < .025, (s =

and the difference between the Inconsistent Background

condition and the Nonsense control,
significant, t <

8

ms, was not

1.

To summarize, again there is evidence that consistent

backgrounds facilitate the object identification process,

-

while there is no clear evidence for interference by the
inconsistent backgrounds.

Taken as a whole, these different

analyses on the naming time data definitively point toward
the conclusion that there is an effect of background

consistency on the latency to name the target object.
Furthermore, in all analyses there is evidence for

facilitation from the consistent backgrounds and there is
less evidence that inconsistent backgrounds interfere.

The results of the analyses on the naming time data,

taken as a whole, indicate that

1)

context does affect the

process of object identification and

2)

consistent context

facilitates the object identification process while

inconsistent context interferes little.

Thus, the same

basic effects that were obtained in Boyce et al.

Experiment

3

(1989),

have been replicated with a different

methodology.
In the introduction, it was suggested that context

effects may not be evident given a longer viewing time.
That is, if the subject has ample time to view the object
that the identification process would work so efficiently
that context would not play a role.
support this view.

In this experiment viewing times on the

scenes were approximately
less than 1%.

The evidence does not

1

second and errors in naming were

Obviously this is enough time for the

background context and the target object to be identified.
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Eye Movement Latency

The final dependent measure from Experiment

latency of the first eye movement.

1

is the

This measure is the time

it took subjects to begin an eye movement from the center
of

the scene to the wiggled object.

It was thought that

differences in this measure might reflect processing of

background information on the first fixation on the scene.
Table

4

Mean Eye Movement Latencies in Experment
Consistent
Background

(in milliseconds)

1

Inconsistent
Background

Average

Meaningful
Background

301

293

297

Nonsense
Background

296

289

293

Average

299

291

In Table

,

4

one can see the mean eye movement latencies

for each of the conditions in Experiment

mean eye movement latency was 295 ms.

1.

Overall the

The only significant

effect present in these data was a main effect of

Consistency F(l,7) = 7.96, MSE =57, p

<

This is a somewhat puzzling result.

.025.

One might expect,

with this measure, to find an effect of background
meaningfulness.

It would seem logical that subjects would

be either faster or slower to move their eyes from center

given a nonsense background.
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However, there was no

.

significant effect of background meaningfulness but there
was an effect of background consistency. Could it
really be
the case that subjects can identify whether the objects
are

consistent or inconsistent with the background completely on
the first fixation on the scene? It seems likely that there
is a slightly more mundane explanation for the main effect

of consistency found in the eye movement latency data.

Recall that the objects are in somewhat different spatial

locations in the consistent background and inconsistent

background scenes.

Although overall the objects are

equidistant from the center of the scene, it seems likely
that something about the placement of the objects in the
scene frame is responsible for this effect.

That is, the

location of the objects in the inconsistent backgrounds are

somewhat easier to respond to when the target object
wiggles.

Although the effect is significant the absolute

value of the difference is small

(8 ms)

Since this effect is significant, however, it seems as

though the best measure of the object identification time is
the naming time from when the target object is fixated.

Both of the other two overall measures include the time to

move off the center of the object which is possibly

confounded with the position of the object.
Subsidiary Analyses
Practice Effects

.

In order to determine whether the

above reported context effects are attenuated over the

course of the experiment the data from this experiment was

divided in half and a three way Analysis of Variance
was
performed with first-half/second-half entered as a factor
the design.

in

Overall, subjects were 86 ms faster in the

second half of the experiment than in the first half.

difference was significant, F(l,7) = 43.32, p

<

This

.001.

However, no other factor interacted with practice.

That is,

although the overall naming time was faster in the second
half of the experiment, the difference between the

Consistent Background condition and the Inconsistent
Background condition stayed roughly the same (Consistent
Inconsistent in the first half = -51 ms.

-

Consistent -

Inconsistent in the second half = -71 ms.).

However, since

the order of the trials was completely randomized across the
experiment, this analysis is confounded with items.

Distance Effects

.

Another subsidiary analysis of

interest is whether the context effect stays the same

whether or not the target object is close to the center of
the scene or far away from the center of the scene.

The

items were divided into two groups: a near group, which was

approximately

3

degrees visual angle from the center, and

a

far group, which were approximately 7.5 degrees from the
center.

The difference between the Consistent Background

condition and the Inconsistent Background condition in the
near was only -8 ms, while the same comparision for the far
items was -212 ms.

Furthermore, the interaction between

background consistency and background type (either
meaningful or nonsense) was not significant for the near

items, F(l,7) = .06, p < .79, while this interaction was

significant for the far items, F(l,7) = 9.35, p

<

.018.

From this it seems reasonable to conclude that distance of
the target object from the center does play a role in the

degree to which context will affect identification.
However, this analysis is somewhat confounded with object

since each object does not occur in both near and far
locations.

Also, some of the cell means in the control

conditions appear odd, probably due to the small sample
size.

Correlation between Consistency Effect and Independent
Ratings

.

The purpose of this analysis was to determine how

well the obtained consistency effect covaried with how

predictable the object was from context.

A separate group

of subjects was given verbal descriptions of the scenes and

then the names of the objects that appeared in the scenes.

These subjects were instructed to rate the object on a scale
from

1

to

scene and

6,

6

with

1

meaning very unlikely to occur in the

meaning very likely to occur in the scene.

These ratings for each item were then correlated with the

consistency effect for that item (Background Consistent
Background Inconsistent)

.

-

The correlation between these

ratings and the consistency effect was relatively low, r =
.20,

but marginally significant, p < .10.
It had been previously thought that context effects

would be evident only when the objects are highly

predictable from the context.
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This result indicates that

context affects object identification even when the object
is only plausible in the context,

not highly predictable

from the context.
In summary, consistent scene context facilitates the

object identification process.

Furthermore, there is little

evidence that the inconsistent scene context interferes with
object identification.

Objects located close to the

original fixation are less affected by context.

Presumably

this is because when the target object is so near, it is

identified in parallel with the background.

Identification

of the target in this case may be completed before the

identification of the background information.

Finally, it

has been found that although there is a moderate correlation

between an object's predictability and its context effect,
this by no means accounts for the context effect completely.

That is, it appears as though objects only need to be in

a

plausible context for facilitation to occur, not a highly

predictive context.
Boyce et al.

This result mirrors the results of

(1989).

Conclusion
These data considered together with previous research

with these scenes indicate that the background information
is certainly processed early enough to facilitate object

identification.

In fact, results from the t-scope

experiments suggest that the meaning of the background can
be extracted in a 150 ms view of the scene.

49

The current

study, however,

is not diagnostic about the time course of

background information acquisition.

It could be that the

background information was obtained primarily on the first
fixation on the center of the screen and then subsequently
ignored.

Or it could be the case that information

concerning the background is continuously processed
throughout the duration of the scene viewing.

The time

course of background information utilization is the question
the second experiment attempted to address.
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CHAPTER
EXPERIMENT

3

2

Introduction
So far it has been demonstrated that scene context does

facilitate object identification even with relatively long

viewing times.

The evidence from Experiment

1

and the

evidence from previous scene research with shorter viewing
durations suggests that scene context information is

extracted quite early in scene viewing.

In fact, the

evidence so far may lead one to suggest that the first stage
of scene processing is the extraction of global scene

meaning and processing shifts to the objects contained
within the scene only when that stage is complete. The
purpose of Experiment

2

was to test claims about the time

course of contextual information utilization.
Loftus (Loftus and Mackworth, 1978; Loftus, 1983) has

suggested that the scene context is identified on the first
fixation, and this guides subsequent scene processing.

Specifically, he claims that the activation of the correct
schema for the scene allows one to determine the likelihood
of occurence of the objects located in the scene.

Then the

eyes are guided to objects that have a low probability of

occurring in the scene.
However, evidence for this view that scene context is

acquired during the first fixation comes, not from his eye

movement research, but from conclusions drawn about t-scope
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research.

He argues that if context effects can be

demonstrated when the scene has been viewed for only 150 ms
then contextual information must be extracted during the
first 150 ms of scene viewing.

While it is true that

information about the context of the scene can be accessed
in 150 ms

(as evidenced by the t-scope research)

this does

not necessarily argue that given longer viewing time all of
the needed contextual information is extracted in the first
150 ms.

If Loftus is correct and all the relevant contextual

information is extracted during the first fixation on the
scene, then the presence of context information on

subsequent fixations on the scene should be relatively
unimportant.

Experiment

2

was a test of this claim.

In

this experiment the background information present on the
first fixation of the scene changed contingent on the

position of the subject's eye.

That is, the type of context

varied from the first fixation to the second fixation on the
scene in an attempt to identify when during scene viewing

context information is utilized.
Method
Subj ects

Nine University of Massachusetts graduate and

undergraduate students participated in the experiment for
payment.

Subjects were paid $25 dollars upon the completion
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of the experiment for a total of

4

hours of participation.

None of these subjects had participated in Experiment

1.

Stimuli
The scenes were exactly the same as those used in

Experiment

1.

However, not all of the target objects from

the first experiment were tested in the current experiment.
In order to reduce the number of trials in this experiment,

three target objects were chosen for each scene instead of
four as in the previous experiment.

not cued from each scene.)

(Thus, two objects were

The decision about which

additional object to exclude was based on a number of
criteria:

a)

Experiment

1;

if subjects had difficulty naming it in
b)

because the voice key was unresponsive to

the name in the first experiment; and

extremely close to the center.

c)

if the object was

The latter criterion was

invoked to ensure that the saccade time would be

sufficiently long to allow for completion of the display
change.

These objects were not eliminated from the scenes;

they just were not cued at any time during the experiment.
Design
The background information was either consistent,

inconsistent or nonsense on the first fixation in the center
of the scene and was either consistent, inconsistent, or

nonsense on second fixation on the scene.

Because the

objects were located in different places in the scenes in
the consistent and inconsistent backgrounds, it was not
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possible to directly change a consistent background into an
inconsistent background (or vice versa) in

a

given trial.

Instead, all of the comparisons had to be made against the

relevant nonsense background control conditions.

resulted in the eight conditions shown in Table
Table

This
5.

5

Conditions of Experiment
First
Background Type

2

Second
Background Type

Label

a)

Consistent

Consistent

BC/BC

b)

Consistent

Nonsense

BC/NBC

c)

Nonsense

Consistent

NBC/BC

d)

Nonsense

Nonsense

NBC/NBC

e)

Inconsistent

Inconsistent

BI/BI

f)

Inconsistent

Nonsense

BI/NBI

g)

Nonsense

Inconsistent

NBI/BI

h)

Nonsense

Nonsense

NBI/NBI

Conditions a,d,e, and h, where the same scene was

present on the first and second fixations on the scene, were

essentially replications of the conditions of Experiment

1.

However, for purposes of control, display changes were

enacted with these four conditions as well.

There might

have been some visual disruption associated with changing
the background, even though the change occured during the
saccades.

Therefore, display changes were carried out on

100% of the trials.

In the above four conditions where the
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content of the background remained the same across the
two
fixations, the second version of the background was reduced
in size by 10%.

It was hoped that this minor size change

would cause similar surface disruptions as in the four other
conditions.

Each of the 48 target objects appeared in all eight
conditions, resulting in 384 trials per subject.

The

presentation of the trials was randomized across the entire
experiment.
into

8

The set of 384 randomized trials were divided

trial blocks of 48 trials a piece.

Subjects took

four one-hour sessions to complete the experiment.

Apparatus
The equipment used in Experiment

2

was exactly the same

as in Experiment 1.

Procedure
The procedure of this experiment was similar to that of

Experiment

1.

The only difference was the display change

that occurred during each trial in this experiment.

The

display was changed when the subject began an eye movement
off the center of the scene.

imaginary boundary

1

When subject's eyes crossed an

degree around the fixation cross the

currently displayed background was removed from the screen
and a second background was plotted on the CRT.

This change

of backgrounds was accomplished within 10 ms, which was

faster than the duration of a typical saccade.

Due to the

suppression of visual information processing during

saccades, the subject did not see the display change

occurring.

When the subject's eye landed on the target

object, the object was now in a different context than when

the trial began.

The voice key was triggered when the

subject named the target object and this terminated the
entire display.
Results and Discussion
The purpose of Experiment

course of context processing.

2

was to investigate the time

Varying whether or not a

consistent, inconsistent or nonsense context was present on

the first, second or both fixations seemed a reasonable way
to investigate this question.

were whether

a)

The questions of interest

all relevant contextual information is

processed early in scene viewing or,

b)

whether contextual

processing continues in parallel with the identification of
the target object. As with the previous experiment,

comparisons cannot be made between Consistent Background
conditions and Inconsistent Background conditions because
the objects were in somewhat different locations in the two

types of backgrounds.

All comparisons must be made against

the appropriate nonsense background condition.

As with Experiment

1,

there were a number of ways to

measure naming time and also many ways to decide which
trials to exclude.

In Experiment

1

there were few

differences between the various measures.

In this

experiment, only one measure of naming time will be
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reported, although the other measures were computed.

Again

no differences between the measures were found, so the

naming times reported here were measured from when the

target object was fixated until the target was named.
trial was included in this analysis if the subject
the trial fixating within

cross and

Table

b)

1

a)

A

began

degree of the center fixation

eventually fixated the target object.

6

Mean Naming Time in Experiment

2

(in milliseconds)

Background on 2nd Fixation
Consistent
Background
(BC)

Background
on 1st

Consistent
Background

Nonsense
Background
(NBC)

663

682

684

673

(BC)

Fixation
Nonsense
Background
(NBC)

Background on 2nd Fixation
Inconsistent
Background
(BI)

Background
on 1st

Inconsistent
Background

Nonsense
Background
(NBI)

724

702

732

717

(BI)

Fixation
Nonsense
Background
(NBI)

Note

-

Naming time measured from when target object was

fixated until target object was named.
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The means for the eight conditions can be seen in Table
6.

The overall naming time averaged across conditions in

Experiment

2

was 697 ms.

Subjects made errors in naming the

target object less than 1% of the time.
Overall, a context effect can be seen in the data.

The

conditions where an inconsistent background was present
(BI/BI, BI/NBI, NBI/BI) resulted in longer naming times than

the consistent background conditions (BC/BC, BC/NBC,
NBC/BC)

,

719 ms vs. 676 ms, respectively.

The main effect

of background consistency was significant, F(l,8) = 47.7, p
<

.0003.

Furthermore, the context effect in this experiment

(BC/BC - BI/BI, a 61 ms difference) was about the same in

magnitude as the context effect in Experiment

1

(63 ms)

.

A

major problem with the data, however, is that a difference
was found between the NBC/NBC condition and the NBI/NBI

condition

(a 44

ms advantage for NBC) and this difference

was significant t(8) = 3.14, p

Experiment
conditions.

1

<

.05,

(s = 42).

In

no difference was found between these two

Theoretically, these should be equal because

there should have been no consistent or inconsistent

interpretation of the nonsense backgrounds with respect to
the target object.

There were no other significant effects.

The consistency effect found with the Nonsense

Background conditions makes any of the other comparisons
hard to interpret.

For example, it could be the case that

the BC/BC condition and the BC/NBC condition were not

significantly different from one another because there was
no additional advantage when the consistent background was
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present on the second fixation.

This would argue that

background information is acquired only during the first
fixation on the scene.

However, these two conditions may be

the same because for some reason the nonsense backgrounds

conveyed meaning about the scene context and so performance
in the BC/NBC condition was the same as in the BC/BC

condition.
It may be that the reason context effects were found

with the nonsense controls has to do with the nature of the
design of this experiment.

In all cases where the

background information changed in content (BC/NBC, NBC/BC.
BI/NBI, NBI/BI) the change was between a meaningful

background and the nonsense background that was a distortion
of the meaningful background.

It could be that over the

course of the experiment subjects began to learn this
pairing.

The result of this would be that the nonsense

backgrounds would no longer be meaningless, but would be
interpreted as a version of the original background.

For

example, perhaps the nonsense version of the street

background was no longer a meaningless context but instead
represented the "messed up version of the street scene" to
the subjects.

A few of the subjects voluntarily expressed

this strategy at the end of the experiment.
If this learning explanation were the cause of the

difference between the nonsense conditions, then doing an
analysis of practice effects should reveal different

patterns of data at the beginning and end of the experiment.
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That is, if subjects were learning the pairing between the

nonsense scenes and the meaningful scenes then perhaps there
should be no difference between the nonsense controls in the

beginning of the experiment.

Unfortunately, since the order

of trials was completely randomized across the experiment

any practice analysis will be confounded by item effects.
One way to analyze the effect of practice on this

difference between the control conditions was to simply
divide the experiment into two halves.

The first set of

four trial blocks makes up the first half and the second set
of four trial blocks makes up the second half.

The

difference between the NBC/NBC and the NBI/NBI conditions in
the first block was 54 ms and in the second block was 60 ms.

This does not support my contention that subjects learned
the pairings over the course of the experiment.

However,

one must keep in mind that since trials were presented in a

completely randomized order, this analysis is confounded
with items.
Perhaps a better way to assess practice effects would
be to analyze only the data from the first experience with

each target object for each subject.

In this way, hopefully

some of the item effects could be controlled for.

this results in a very small number of trials.

However,

Therefore,

means were computed counting only the first time the subject
saw a particular target object in the consistent backgrounds
and the first time they saw the target in the inconsistent

backgrounds.

Since order of items was not conterbalanced

across condition it resulted in a somewhat unequal N per

condition.

The results of this analysis were not much more

successful than the previous practice analysis.

While a

difference between the nonsense backgrounds still exists
(NBC/NBC was 35 ms faster than NBI/NBI)

,

the difference is

smaller than the overall difference.
To summarize, there is not very strong evidence for the

proposal that subjects learned the pairings between the

meaningful backgrounds and nonsense backgrounds.

However,

the above practice analyses were all confounded in one way
or another.

The fact remains that context effects were

found with the nonsense backgrounds (in contrast to

Experiment

1)

and this made other differences (or lack of)

in the experiment impossible to interpret.

One interesting facet of this experiment was the number
of times subjects reported an awareness of a scene change.

Scene backgrounds changed on 100% of the trials.

On 50% of

the trials this change was minor (only a size change) and on

the remaining 50% of the trials the change was major (change
in the meaning of the scene)

.

When asked at the end of the

experiment whether they noticed these changes, subjects

drastically underestimated the percentage of times
occurred.

a

change

Most subjects thought the backgrounds had changed

on 10-25% of the trials indicating that they were unaware of

the display change on a large percentage of the trials.
In summary, because of the problems with the control

conditions in this experiment, little can be concluded from
these data.

While the context effect found in Experiment
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1

was replicated, we have learned little about the time c
of contextual information processing.

conducted to remedy this.
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Experiment

3

was

CHAPTER
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3

Introduction
The purpose of Experiment

3

was to evaluate the

questions about time course of contextual processing set out
in Experiment 2.

Experiment

2

failed to illuminate the time

course issue because the Nonsense Background Control

conditions also showed a context effect.

For this reason,

better control conditions were needed*
A decision was made to use a grid background instead of
the nonsense backgrounds to serve as controls for the

differences in object location between the consistent and
inconsistent scenes.

The grid was a neutral background

which conveyed no semantic or depth information.

The major

advantage of the grid was that no meaning could possibly be

ascribed to it.

Therefore, any observed difference between

the "consistent" and "inconsistent" grid conditions would be
due to the somewhat different spatial locations of the

objects in these two conditions.
The major disadvantage of using the grid instead of the

nonsense backgrounds is that the grid probably does not

represent a neutral baseline upon which to measure

facilitation versus interference.

The grid differs from the

meaningful backgrounds in many visual characteristics.

For

example, it contains no depth information and appears as a

visually regular field, instead of a meaningless background.
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For these reasons it was not possible with this experiment
to determine whether consistent backgrounds facilitate

object identification or whether inconsistent backgrounds
interfere with object identification.

However, information

about the utilization of background information over time

should be available from this experiment.
Method

Subjects
Eight undergraduate students participated in this
experiment.

Many of the students attended other

universities and were spending the summer in Amherst.

Upon

completion of the experiment subjects were paid $30 for

approximately

4

hours of participation.

Stimuli
The consistent and inconsistent backgrounds and the

objects were exactly the same as were used in Experiment

2.

However, the nonsense backgrounds were not used in this

experiment and were replaced by Grid Backgrounds.

The grid

was constructed from twelve regularly spaced horizontal
lines and twelve vertical lines.

resembled a piece of graph paper.

This grid background

Objects were superimposed

on the grid background and the portions of the grid that

were located "behind" the objects were deleted.

The

resulting scene looked like randomly placed objects in a
graph paper background.
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Design
The design of Experiment

Experiment

2*

3

was virtually identical to

Subjects named each target object in each of

the eight conditions shown in Table

Table

7.

7

Conditions of Experiment
Background
on Fixation

1

3

Background
on Fixation

Label

2

a)

Consistent

Consistent

BC/BC

b)

Consistent

Grid

BC/Gr

c)

Grid

Consistent

Gr/BC

d)

Grid

Grid

Gr/Gr

e)

Inconsistent

Inconsistent

BI/BI

f)

Inconsistent

Grid

BI/Gr

g)

Grid

Inconsistent

Gr/BI

h)

Grid

Grid

Gr/Gr

The only difference between conditions d and h (both

labelled Gr/Gr) was that the objects were located in
somewhat different positions within the two-dimensional
frame of the scene.

If performance differs in these two

conditions it must be due to this location difference since
they have exactly the same grid background.

As a result of

having this measure of object location differences,
comparisions could be made directly between the Consistent

Background conditions and the Inconsistent Background
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.

.

conditions, taking into account the effect of target
location.

As in Experiment

2,

the same 48 target objects were

cued in each of the eight conditions for each subject.

resulted in 384 trials over the entire experiment.

This

These

384 trials were divided into eight blocks of 48 trials.

It

generally took four one hour sessions for a subject to
complete all eight blocks.
The only other difference in design from Experiment

2

was that trials were no longer completely randomized across
the experiment.

Instead, the order of trials was

counterbalanced in the following manner:

Each block of 48

trials consisted of one exposure for each target.

The

condition in which this target appeared was counterbalanced
across subjects.

Within the block of 48 trials the order

Thus, a practice analysis, comparing the first

was random.

half of the experiment with the second half, would no longer
be confounded by having different sets of items in the two

halves

Apparatus and Procedure
The apparatus and procedure were exactly the same as in

Experiment

2
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Results and Discussion

Naming Time
The purpose of Experiment

3

was to determine whether

background information is utilized from only the first
fixation on a scene or from both fixations on the scene.
The primary measure was again object naming time.
shown in Table

5

The data

is the object naming time in Experiment

measured from when the target object was fixated.

3

Criteria

for including a trial were exactly the same as in Experiment
2.

The subject had to

a)

be fixating the center region of

the scene when the trial began (within

1

degree of the

center) and b) eventually fixate within one degree of the

target object before naming it.

Also, as before, trials

where a naming error occurred were also not included.
Naming errors happened very infrequently, less than 1% of
the time.
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Table

8

Mean Naming Time in Experiment

3

^in milliseconds)

Background on 2nd Fixation

Background
on 1st

Consistent
Background

Grid

(BC)

(Gr)

Consistent
Background

722

720

733

741

(BC)

Fixation
Grid
(Gr)

Background on 2nd Fixation

Background
on 1st
Fixation

Inconsistent
Background

Grid

(BI)

(Gr)

Inconsistent
Background

790

766

764

741

(BI)

Grid
(Gr)

Note - Naming time measured from when target object was
fixated until target object was named.

The average overall naming time in Experiment
As can be seen in Table

ms.

8

3

was 747

naming time in the control

conditions (both labelled Gr/Gr) was exactly the same (741
ms)

.

This indicated that there was no effect of the spatial

location of the target objects.

Therefore it was reasonable

to make the direct comparisions between the cells in the top
of the table, the Consistent conditions and the cells in the

bottom of the table, the Inconsistent conditions.

The

difference between the Consistent Background (BC/BC) and
68

.

Inconsistent Background (BI/BI) conditions was -68 ms.
Objects were named faster when they were located in the

conistent backgrounds than when they were in the
inconsistent backgrounds.
t(7) = 7.4, p < .005,

This difference was significant,

(s = 26).

findings of Experiments

1

and

This effect replicated the

2.

To evaluate the effect of background information on the

first fixation on the scene, naming times can be compared in
the BC/Gr condition against naming time in the BI/Gr
condition.

Subjects were

46

ms faster to name the target

object when a consistent background was present on the first
fixation than if an inconsistent background was present on
the first fixation.
4.3, p < .005,

This difference was significant t(7) =

(s = 30)

The comparision between the Gr/BC condition and the
Gr/BI condition is one indication of the role of background
Object located in

information on the second fixation.

consistent backgrounds on the second fixation only were
named 31 ms faster than object located in an inconsistent

background on the second fixation only.
significant, t(7) = 3.2, p < .025,

(s

This difference was

= 27).

Thus, the

results of this set of comparisons indicated that

a)

background information affected object identification most
when present for the entire trial,

b)

background information

c)
can be acquired from the first fixation on the scene and
background information was also acquired during the second

fixation on the scene.
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Even though there was no difference between the two

Grid Background Controls an argument could be made that
these conditions should still be included in the
comparisons.

For this reason, somewhat more complicated

comparisons were performed on the data.

Since the

difference between the grid conditions can be taken as a

measure of the effect of object location it would be
reasonable to assess the effects of interest by comparing
the consistent and inconsistent conditions minus any effect
of the object location.

Specifically, if one wanted to

assess the role of background information on the first

fixation the appropriate computation would be (BC/Gr BI/Gr)

-

(Gr/Gr - Gr/Gr)

.

The first term in the equation

represents the direct comparison between the consistent and
inconsistent conditions and the second term represents the

difference due to object location.

The results of this

comparison were very like those reported above.

The effect

of background consistency when the background was present

for the entire trial,

(BC/BC - BI/BI) - (Gr/Gr - Gr/Gr), was

significant, t(7) = 6.5, p < .005.

The effect of background

on the first fixation of the scene,

(BC/Gr - BI/Gr) - (Gr/Gr

- Gr/Gr),

was also significant, t(7) = 2.5, p

<

.025.

Finally, the effect of background on the second fixation,
(Gr/BC - Gr/BI)

-

(Gr/Gr - Gr/Gr), was also significant,

t(7) = 2.1, p < .05.
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Table

9

Mean Differences between Consistent and Inconsistent
Conditions in Experiment

3

(in milliseconds)

Background on Second Fixation
Meaningful

Background

Grid

Meaningful

-68

-46

Grid

-31

0

Mean

-50

-23

on
First

Fixation

Table

9

shows the differences between the means of

Consistent and Inconsistent conditions shown in Table
(i.e. the efffects discussed above)

in Table

BI/BI.

9

(-68 ms)

8

The upper left entry

.

is the difference between BC/BC and

Similarly, the upper right entry (-46 ms) is the

Another way to test

difference between BC/Gr - BI/Gr, etc.

the effect of background on the second fixation would be to

test for differences in the marginals in Table

9.

This test

would indicate the difference between the average
consistency effect with meaningful backgrounds and the
average consistency effect with grid backgrounds on the

Another way to represent this comparison

second fixation.
is

[ [

(BC/BC-BI/BI) + Gr/BC-Gr/BI]/2]

(Gr/Gr-Gr/Gr) ]/2]

,

-

[

(BC/Gr-BI/Gr) +

where the first term in brackets is the

average consistency effect in the conditions where a

meaningful background was present on fixation

2

and the

second bracketed term represents the average consistency
effect when a grid was present on fixation
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2.

This

.

difference, a 27 ms advantage for meaningful backgrounds,

was significant, t(7) = 3.67, p

<

.01.

Thus, overall there

was an effect of background type (either meaningful or grid)
on the second fixation on the scene.

two entries in Table

By comparing the upper

one can assess the role of the

9,

second background given that a meaningful background was

present on the first fixation.
BI/BI) - (BC/Gr - BI/Gr)
1.52,

.05 < p < .10.

entries on Table

9,

,

This comparison,

(BC/BC -

was marginally significant, t =

The comparison between the lower two
a difference of 31 ms,

tests the effect

of the second background type given a grid on the first

fixation.

This comparison has already been reported above,

and was significant, t(7) = 2.1, p

<

.05.

Thus, overall

there was a significant effect of background type on the

second fixation (27 ms)

;

a marginal effect if the background

on the first was meaningful (22 ms) and a significant effect
if the background on the first was meaningless (31 ms)

Furthermore, the difference between this 22 ms effect and

the 31 ms effect was not significant.

These results, taken together, indicate that scene

backgrounds on the second fixation do affect object
identification.

The above analyses demonstrated that,

although the effect of second background was slightly less

given that a grid was presented on the first fixation, this
was not significantly different than if a grid had been

presented on the first fixation.
The above analyses all indicated that the background

affects processing on both fixations on the scene.

In fact.

.

the data appear roughly additive.

The effect of background

information during the entire trial (68 ms) is almost the
sum of the effect of background information on the first

fixation (46 ms) and the effect of background information on
the second fixation (31 ms)
The fact that background information was acquired

during the first fixation on the scene is not a surprising
result.

Context effects have been found when the scene has

been presented only for brief durations (see Boyce et al.,
1989; Biederman et al, 1982).

Hence, it was known that

processing of background information could occur very
quickly.

The more surprising finding in the current experiment
was the effect of background information on the second
fixation.

Loftus (1983; see also Loftus and Mackworth,

1978) has proposed that during the first fixation on a scene

the contextual information is processed and that later

fixations on the scene are specifically for the purpose of

identifying the objects.

This model invokes some sort of

attentional mechanism that, metaphorically, could be thought
of as a spotlight.

During the first fixation on the scene,

the attentional spotlight is quite large, encompassing most
of the scene.

During this time large-grained visual

information (perhaps corresponding to the scene background)
is acquired.

After the context is identified, the eyes move

to an object located in the scene.
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At this time the

spotlight narrows to focus all resources on identifying the
fixated object.

The results from this experiment indicate that this

model is not correct if it assumes that scene background

information is not processed after the first fixation.

In

fact, this experiment indicates that scene backgrounds must

be identified at some level on the first fixation (or there

should not have been context effects on fixation

1)

and that

further processing of the background continues during the

second fixation.

Perhaps the background is identified at a

very global level on the first fixation and then further

background processing results in a more detailed
representation of the background.
This result (the effect of background on fixation

2)

also adds to our knowledge about information acquisition and
eye movements during scene viewing.

First, it can be

concluded that the region of the scene that is fixated is
not necessarily the only region that is being processed.
That is, even while fixating the target object, subjects

must have been acquiring additional information about the
background.

Since the subjects were instructed to name the

target object as fast as possible, however, one would think
that the best strategy would be to focus all resources on
the target object once it has been located and ignore the

background.

The fact that subjects accumulated background

information from the second fixation on the scene indicates
that this strategy was not used.
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•

Second, this result suggests that information about the

context gained on one fixation on the scene can be carried
across an intervening saccade.

One would not have expected

to get an additional benefit from having the context present
for the entire trial if this were not the case.

However,

this experiment can make no claim about the nature of the
code in which information is integrated across subsequent

fixations (i.e. whether it is stored in a visual or semantic
code)

To summarize, the findings of this experiment replicate

the previously found context effect.

Furthermore they

indicate that background information is acquired during both

fixations on the scene.

These results will be discussed

further in the general discussion.
Eye Movement Latency

A second dependent measure that was included in the
data record was subjects' time to respond to the wiggle by

moving their eyes off the center of the scene.

The mean eye

movement latencies for each condition can be seen in Table
10.

Averaging across conditions, the mean eye movement
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Table 10

Mean Eye Movement Latency in Experiment

3

Xin milliseconds)

Background on 2nd Fixation

Background

Consistent
Background

on 1st

(BC)

Consistent
Background

Grid

(BC)

(Gr)

311

307

288

290

Fixation
Grid
(Gr)

Background on 2nd Fixation

Background
on 1st
Fixation

Inconsistent
Background

Inconsistent
Background

Grid

(BI)

(Gr)

312

311

284

285

(BI)

Grid
(Gr)

latency was 299 ms.

A three factor analysis of variance

conducted on this data indicated that there was only a main
effect of background type on the first fixation F(l,7) =
268.3, p < .00002).

That is, if the background on the first

fixation was a grid subjects moved their eyes to the wiggled
object faster than if the background on the first fixation
was meaningful.
One explanation for this result is that since the

visual information in the grid background condition was

considerably less complex than the meaningful background
conditions, there was less information to process on the

first fixation when the grid background was present.

This,

in turn, would allow subjects to register the wiggle faster.

Practice Analysis
As with the previous two experiments an analysis of the

effect of practice was conducted.

In this analysis, as

before, the data from the first four trial blocks

constitutes the first half of the experiment and data from
the last four trial blocks makes up the second half of the

experiment.

Because of the counterbalancing of item and

order in this experiment, however, practice effects are no

longer confounded with item effects.

The results from a

four way analysis of variance indicated an 85 ms effect of
No other factors

practice (F(l,7)= 191.6, p

<

interacted with practice.

Thus, the effects in the second

.001).

half of the experiment were exactly the same as in the first
half.

Items Analysis

The purpose of doing an items analysis on the data was
to determine if the effects reported above in the naming

time section are the same if one collapses across subject
and analyzes by item.

Specifically, it was of interest

whether or not the three important comparisons (BC/BC vs.
BI/BI, BC/Gr vs. BI/Gr, and Gr/BC vs. Gr/BI) would be

significant across items.

That is, were the observed

effects due to a subset of the items included in the
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experiment or are the effects reliable for all items?
Simple effects t-tests were conducted on the naming time
data reported in the above section, but collapsed across
subject, looking at items.

There were significant

differences between the BC/BC condition and the BI/BI
condition, t(47) =4.3, p < .005 and between

BI/Gr conditions, t(47) = 2.64, p

<

.025.

BC/Gr and

However, the

effect of background on the second fixation (Gr/BC vs.
Gr/BI) was only marginally significant, t(47) =1.82, p <
.10.

Thus, the principal effects in the experiment were

quite consistent over the various target objects.
In summary. Experiment

3

answered questions about the

time course of background information acquisition during
scene viewing.

Specifically, background information was

acquired on both the first and second fixations on a scene.
The ramifications of the findings for models of scene

perception will be discussed in the General Discussion.
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CHAPTER

5

GENERAL DISCUSSION
Introduction
The three experiments reported here indicated that

context facilitates the object identification process,

a)

b)

scene backgrounds are one locus of these context effects,

c)

background information is acquired during the first fixation
on a scene and d) background information is also acquired

during the second fixation on a scene.

The results of these

experiments lay to rest the concerns that the prior research

using brief exposures overestimated the degree to which
context affects object identification.

The present "wiggle"

paradigm allowed subjects ample time to view the target
object and context effects were still found.
the results of Experiment

3

In addition,

indicate that a strictly serial

model of scene processing (as proposed by Loftus, 1983) is
also not correct.

Background information was acquired on

both fixations on the scene.

These results have

ramifications for models of scene processing and suggest the
outline of a model of scene processing that addresses the
issues of:

a)

the mechanism of the facilitation;

course of contextual information acquisition; and
role of eye movements in scene viewing.
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b)
c)

time
the

Mechanism of Facilitation
As was outlined in the introduction, there are at least

two possible mechanisms of facilitation:

Priming and Schema Activation.

Object to Object

Each of these mechanisms

will be discussed in light of the results of the current
experiments.
Obj ect to Object Priming

The object to object priming hypothesis is that when

related objects occur in scenes together, the identification
of one object facilitates the identification of others.

There are two problems with the object to object priming

hypothesis with regard to this data:

a)

nature of the priming relationships and

the formal semantic
b)

the magnitude of

the priming effect.

This hypothesis views the important relationships

between objects to be semantic or associative.

That is,

"dog" and "cat" are related by nature of their common

association with one another and "apple" and "orange" are
related because they belong to the same semantic category.
I

have argued in the introduction that this definition of

relations is not sufficient to account for scene context
effects.

That is, objects that typically co-occur in scenes

may not be semantically or associatively related to one
another.

A glance at the Appendix where the objects in the

scenes were listed indicates that most of the objects used
in the current experiments are not strongly related to one
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another under this defininition of relationship.
importantly, Boyce et al.

(1989)

Experiment

2

Most

investigated

the influence of cohort objects on object identification.

Contrary to the object to object priming hypothesis, the
cohorts had no effect.
The magnitude of the object to object priming effect

found by Henderson et al.
into question.

(1989)

also calls this mechanism

In a naming time experiment similar to the

current experiments (except without scene context) objects
were named 13 ms faster if a related object was fixated

prior to the target than if an unrelated object was fixated
first.

Furthermore, this priming effect was found

predominantly when the subjects were given no preview of the
target object.

In contrast, across the current three

experiments the average effect of background consistency was
64 ms.

That is, objects were named 64 ms faster in the

consistent backgrounds than in the inconsistent backgrounds.
Thus, even if one could demonstrate that an object to object

priming mechanism is at work during scene processing, it

would have a very small effect relative to the effect of
scene backgrounds on object identification.

Thus, the bulk

of the evidence suggests that object idenfication is

facilitated by scene backgrounds and that the simple object
to object priming explanation proposed by Henderson et al.

cannot account for these findings.
However, a more sophisticated version of the object to

object priming hypothesis may be able to account for this
data.

If one assumes that backgrounds are large objects and
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that the associations between objects can be episodic as
well as semantic then the object to object priming

hypothesis may be able to account for this data.

However,

this model still leaves the lack of cohort effects to be
explained.

That is, this model would have to also assume

some greater strength of relationship between the

backgrounds and objects than between the objects that cooccur in the scenes.
Schema Activation
A schema activation account of the present paradigm is
as follows: Identification of the background leads to the

activation of the appropriate schema for the scene.

Once

this superordinate node in the schema is activated, it

facilitates the identification of objects likely to fit into
the context; that is, object representations that are

connected to this superordinate scene node.

While this account seems reasonable, it raises the
question of how this schema activation actually facilitates
object identification.

It seems as though there are two

ways that this facilitation can occur:

a)

background

identification could speed up further perceptual processing
or b) background indentif ication could limit the amount of

further perceptual processing necessary.

Each of these

possible mechanisms will be discussed.
We know that the rate of visual information acquisition
is not constant.

Many things can alter the rate at which
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one can extract visual features.

For example,

(1985; see also Loftus, Nelson and Kallman,

Loftus

1983) has found

that the intensity of the stimulus display is closely

related to the speed of acquisition of pictorial
information.

T-scope experiments with letters show that

perceptual information is acquired slower from the periphery
than from the fovea (Estes, 1978; Sperling, 1970).

Perhaps

context affects object identification by speeding up the
rate at which visual information is acquired.

That is, once

the appropriate schema has been activated, perceptual

processes speed up and object information is accumulated at
a faster rate.

The largest problem with this mechanism is

that it is not clear how the higher order processes can
"feed back" and alter the mechanics of perception.

For

example, it is hard to imagine that higher order processes

affect the speed at which photochemicals in the retina work.
Perhaps the feature acquisition is somehow speeded in the

primary visual cortex, but it is still not clear how
semantic information can be directed back to affect these
processes.
It seems more plausible that scene context limits the

amount of perceptual processing necessary for identification
to occur.

That is, when the appropriate schema is activated

in memory, activation is spread to the related subordinate

object nodes.

If one assumes that there is some threshold

that must be reached for object identification to occur, one

could think of this additional activation to the object node
as equivalent to lowering its threshold.
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In either case,

less input from the perceptual system is necessary
for

threshold to be reached.

This model does not assume context

modulates the rate at which perceptual information accrues.
For example, when the kitchen background is identified,

activating the "kitchen node" in memory, activation is
spread to the related concepts "toaster", "glass", etc.

When visual information about

toaster is input into the

a

system it takes less time for the toaster node in memory to
reach threshold.
quickly.

Thus, the name TOASTER can be said

This mechanism is similar to that proposed by

McClelland and Rumelhart (1981)

.

The important aspect of

this explanation is that it does not require that perceptual

processes are altered by context, only that one can "act"
earlier on the basis of less advanced perceptual processing.
This mechanism would also predict that there would be
little or no interference in the Inconsistent Background
condition.

If the background is identified as a bathroom,

instead of a kitchen, one would expect that toaster would
not be facilitated, since bathroom is not connected to

toaster in memory and one would not expect this to
interefere.

In the inconsistent background scenes, object

representations were still facilitated by the context, it
was just not the objects that were pictured in the scene.
That is, in the bathroom background with the kitchen objects

(Inconsistent Condition) activation from bathroom node would

have spread activation to plunger, toilet paper, etc.

This

activation would not have affected speed of recognition for
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toaster which was not facilitated or interfered
with by the
identification of the bathroom background. The results
of

Boyce et al.

(1989)

hypothesis.

It was found that the only predictor of context

Experiment

2

would support this

effects was the relationship between the target object and
the scene background.

There is one result from the current experiments that
does not fit very well with this schema explanation.

Experiment

1,

In

the scene consistency effect was not highly

correlated with ratings of how well the objects fit in the
scene context.

An independent group of subjects rated the

objects for their degree of consistency with the backgrounds
and the correlation of this measure with the difference

between identification in the Consistent and Inconsistent
conditions was only 0.2.

If the schema view was correct

then one would have expected this correlation to be higher.

That is, the more predictable the object was from the
background, the more activated that object node should have

This is a somewaht puzzling result in light of the

been.

manner in which these scenes were created.

In order to

generate the ideas for the scenes, an independent group of
subjects listed objects that they thought were most likely
to occur in the backgrounds.

This is the typical way of

examining the contents of peoples' schemas (see Handler,
1984)

.

This result does not necessarily invalidate a schema
organization, but it may suggest that schema activation is a

more interactive process.

That is, it is possible that the
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scene background provides initial access to a
general schema
for the context, such as "room", or even "bedroom",
and at
the same time partial identification of the target
object

facilitates another, more specific schema, for example,
"child's room".

This activation spreading down from a more

global scene schema and up through partial identification of
the target object may result in greater activation for the

more specific schema.

The target object may be highly

predictable with respect to this more specific schema, but
only plausible in the more generic "bedroom" schema.

Since

the ratings were obtained by giving subjects generic labels
for the scenes, such as "bedroom scene", the moderate

correlation may not truly reflect the degree to which the
objects were predictable from the background.
The organization of schemas is still not well

understood and their proponents have been widely criticized
because schema theory makes few predictions and because when
it is adapted to account for a wide range of phenomena, many

ad-hoc (and potentially inconsistent) assumptions are made.
I

do agree with some of these criticisms.

However, the

results of these experiments, taken together with the

previous literature on context effects (Antes, 1977; Antes
et al.,

1981; Biederman,

1973; Biederman et al.

1979; Loftus et al.,

1972; Biederman, Glass and Stacy,

1982; Boyce et al, 1989; Friedman,

1978),

indicate that the relationship

between context and the object identification process is not
a simple associative one.
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No modular semantic network explanation is going
to be

able to account for these findings, to the extent
that the

relationships in the semantic network are not based on the

probability of co-occurence.

The modified version of the

object to object priming hypothesis, which begins to

resemble the schema organization, may be able to account for
the data because backgrounds may function in the network as

large objects.

However, the lack of a cohort effect

indicates that the relationship between backgrounds and the

objects likely to occur in them is stronger than the

relationship between the scene objects themselves.

Even the

modified object to object priming network cannot account for
this.

The hierarchical organization of schemas can account

for these effects.

A schema organization that posited

strong connections between the background and the objects
and only weak, or non-existent connections between the

objects best accounts for the data.
Time Course of Context Information Acquisition
The major finding with respect to the time course of

contextual processing was that consistent backgrounds

facilitated object identification on both fixations on the
scene and furthermore, this effect was roughly additive.
This is a somewhat puzzling result if one thinks that

identification of context is an all or nothing process.
That is, how could it be that the background present on the
first fixation was identified enough to facilitate object

identification but then further information extracted on the
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.

second fixation led to greater facilitation?

There are at

least two mechanisms that could account for the additive

effect of background on both fixations.

The first

I

will

call the "levels of representation" hypothesis and the

second the "neighborhood" hypothesis.
The levels of representation hypothesis holds that

backgrounds are represented in memory at various levels of
specificity.

Perhaps there is a node superordinate to

"kitchen" that represents something like "room in a house".
Or, maybe there is a level between "kitchen" and "room in a

house" that we do not have a word for in our language.

The

idea here is that there is a more general representation for

the backgrounds' meaning stored in memory.

During the first

fixation on the scene, it is this level of representation
that is activated.

This activation partially

f acilicitates

the representations for the objects that could occur in this
scene.

During the second fixation on the scene, the

background is processed further and this results in contact

with the more detailed and specific representation for the
background.

This also facilitates object identification.

Thus, this hypothesis would argue that there are multiple

levels of representations stored in memory for each scene
and the facilitation for the target object was two sources;
the more general representation and the more specific

representation

A second mechanism is the "neighborhood" hypothesis.
Background information acquired on the first fixation on the
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scene could activate more than one schema.

Backgrounds that

share many of the same visual characteristics could be

activated by the information acquired on the first fixation.
This would weakly activate objects that are consistent with
the scene background and objects that are consistent with

visually similar backgrounds.

During the second fixation on

the scene, additional information about the background is

acquired and this raises the activation for one schema above
that of other schemas.

At this point, one interpretation of

the background has been arrived at and this results in

further facilitation for only the objects that are

consistent with this background.

This hypothesis holds that

backgrounds and their related objects are only represented
once in memory.

The major difference between the two models is the
following: in the first model only a subset of the objects

eventually activated are activated early in the processing.
In contrast, the second model posits that a larger number of

objects (including inappropriate ones) are activated early
in processing and then are narrowed down further by

additional processing of the background.

The data from the

current experiments cannot distinguish between these two
mechanisms.

However, they make testable predictions.

If

the "neighborhood" mechanism is correct, than having

background information present only on the first fixation on
the scene should result in facilitation for objects that are

unrelated to the current background (but related to
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a

visually similar background) as well as facilitating
the
correct set of objects.
One interesting aspect of the results of Experiment

3

is that it appears as though processing of the background

information past the first fixation on the scene is
obligatory.

That is, even when the target object had been

located and the subject had fixated the target, background

information acquisition continued.

This result would argue

for obligatory processing of background to some level of

comprehension.

Thus,

it appears as though background

information is so important to the process of object

identification that the extraction of meaning from the

background continues even while the target object is being
identified.

In the levels of processing hypothesis the

further background processing results in a contact with a

more detailed schema for the scene.

According to the

neighborhood hypothesis, this further background processing
on the second fixation results in the elimination of the

activation for visually similar background schemas.
Eye Movements

,

Covert Attention and Scene Processing

The primary purpose of the current research was to

investigate questions about the role of context in object
identification.

However, the results of the current

experiments do add to our knowledge about eye movements,
covert attention and information acquisition in scene
viewing.

Specifically, these experiments speak to the
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questions of extrafoveal information acquisition and
integration of information across saccades.
Perceptual Span and Scene Perception
"Perceptual span" refers to the region of text from

which a reader is acquiring useful information (Rayner,
1975).

Rayner (1975) determined that in addition to

acquiring information from the word that is in the fovea,
information to the right of the currently fixated word can
be acquired as well.

The quality of this extrafoveal

information varies as a function of its distance from the
fixation point.

Some research has been conducted to determine the size
of the perceptual span in scenes.

Saida and Ikeda (1979),

using the moving window technique, concluded that the

perceptual span for scenes was about 50% of the area

surrounding the fixation point.

That is, on a given

fixation, useful information was being acquired from about
50% of the scene.

Nelson and Loftus (1980) found that

little information about details in the scene a fixation
could be extracted from further than about 1.5 degrees from
fixation.

The current experiments indicated that extrafoveal

information can be extracted from a large region of the
scene.

In all of the experiments, the first fixation on the

scene was in the center.

These scenes were designed so that

very little useful background information would be provided
foveally when fixating the center of these scenes and there
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was never an object in the center of the scene.

Thus, any

background information that was acquired during the first
fixation must have been acquired from extrafoveal
processing.

The results from Experiment

3

indicated that

context information was acquired during the first fixation
on the scene.

The fact that context information was acquired

extrafoveally during the first fixation on the scene might
not be too surprising in light of the fact that there was

very little foveal processing to be done in the center of
these scenes.

Hence, during the first fixation on the scene

all of one's resources could be devoted completely to

peripheral information extraction.

The more surprising

result was the effect of context on the second fixation.

Extrafoveal information was processed even when the target
object was in the fovea.

These data do not indicate the exact size of the
perceptual span but they do indicate that it is larger than
2

degrees.

The visual information that conveyed the meaning

of the backgrounds was spread over a large region.

In a

separate pilot study, subjects were not able to accurately
identify the background when given only the center
of the scene.

2

degrees

Thus, background information acquired on the

first fixation must have been from a region larger than
degrees.

2

Similarly, since backgrounds were processed during

the second fixation on the scene and we know that the target

object (approximately

2

degrees in size) resided in the
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fovea at this time, we can conclude that
the perceptual span
is considerably larger than two degrees.
In summary,
a)

from these results it can be concluded that

the size of the perceptual span is large (at the very

least larger than

2

degrees) and b) the size of the

perceptual span does not vary drastically from the first to
the second fixation on the scene.
The fact that background information was acquired

during the fixation on the target object indicates that we
should use caution when employing a measure like fixation

duration as a measure of object identification time.

Since

more than the target object was being processed during the
second fixation on the scene, therefore, fixation durations
are likely to reflect not only time to identify the object,

but other factors as well, such as processing of the
context.

Integration of Information Across Saccades
Some kind of information is integrated across saccades,

but the major unresolved question is what kind (level) of

information is undergoing the integration.

The bulk of the

evidence from experiments employing text indicates it is not
basic "retinal" information that is integrated but something

more abstract (Rayner, McConkie and Zola 1980; McConkie and
Zola,

1979)

.

Similar experiments with pictures (Pollatsek,

Rayner and Collins, 1984) found that some sort of abstract
shape information was also integrated across saccades.
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The current experiments indicate that the
background
information acquired on one fixation can affect
processing
on a subsequent fixation.
The major evidence for this comes
from the added advantage of having a consistent scene

background present on both fixations over having it present
on just one of the fixations.

Since the advantage of having

a consistent background on both fixations was substantially

greater than having the background present only on the
second fixation on the scene, background information was

integrated across saccades.
The results of Experiment

3

also suggest that the

information integrated across the saccade was not "featural"
information but some higher order code.

If integration was

attempted with some visual feature level information one
might expect to get large disruption effects in the

conditions where major changes in the background information
occurred from fixation to fixation.

The average naming time

in the four background switching conditions was 746 ms

compared with 749 ms where much smaller changes occurred
(only a size change)

.

Thus, it appears as though something

more conceptual (i.e. the meaning of the background) was

integrated across successive fixations on the scene.

In

summary, the results of the current experiments corroborate

the view that higher order conceptual information is

integrated across saccades.
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Allocation of Covert Attention
There at least two ways in which attention could be
allocated during scene processing. The first, which I
have

already discussed, could be termed the "zoom model".

in

this view, during the first fixation on a scene, attention
is diffused over the entire visual field.

Subsequently, the

spotlight of attention is narrowed to encompass only the
target object.

The second model of attention allocation is

one proposed by Henderson, Pollatsek and Rayner (1989) which

they term the sequential attention hypothesis.

This model

states that attention is first allocated to the foveal
region, and then after some threshold of identification of

foveal information has been crossed, attention is shifted to
a

new region of the visual field.
The results of Experiment

model" as proposed by Loftus.

3

seem to rule out the "zoom

It was not the case that the

background information was attended to only during the first
fixation on the scene.

This result is somewhat suprising,

given that the zoom strategy seems like an efficient way to
Since enough background

process scene information.

information was extracted during the first fixation on the
scene to cause facilitation for the target object, it seems
like it would have been a good strategy to focus all

processing resources on the target object once is had been
located.

This is not what happened.

Henderson et al.
zoom hypothesis.

(1989)

also tested the valdity of the

In their experiments (done with arrays of
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objects and not scenes) they found that
attention was not
first allocated to all regions of the display,
but instead
was allocated in a sequential manner. That is,
attention
was first allocated to the foveal object and then
allocated
to the object that was to be fixated next. They
suggested
that the allocation of attention during scene viewing may
function in the same fashion.

There is some weak evidence in the current experiments

against this sequential attention mechanism.

In order to

account for the context effects on the second fixation on
the scene with this mechanism, one would have to propose

that processing of the foveal target object was done first
and then attention was allocated to some other region of the

scene (perhaps somewhere on the background)

.

It is not

clear that this could account for the results obtained.
First,

it would not be effecient to shift attention off the

target object in the current paradigm once it had been
located.

Second,

it is unclear how context could have an

effect during the second fixation if the background was

attended to only after the target object (foveal region) had
been processed.

Thus, this serial mechanism does not seem

to be at work in the current paradigm.

Instead it appears

as though during the first two fixations on a scene,

attention is allocated to the entire visual field and this
The evidence

does not change over the course of the trial.

from the current experiments thus indicates that neither

simple mechanism

—

zoom or sequential shift
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—

is an

adequate model of selective attention during the
first few
fixations on a scene.
Conclusion
I

have outlined a model of scene perception which

accounts for the results of the three experiments reported
in this dissertation.

The model suggests that the

identification of scene backgrounds activates a schema for
the scene stored in memory.

Once the top node in the

correct schema has been activated (this node represents the
background) the activation spreads to objects that are

consistent with the background.

Because the object nodes

consistent with the background have been partiallyactivated, less perceptual information is necessary for the

identification threshold to be reached.
The process of contacting the correct schema is not

necessarily completed in the first fixation.

Partial

identification of background information might either

a)

make contact with some superordinate, less specified,

representation initially, or
related schemas.

b)

activate a neighborhood of

Further background processing during the

second fixation on the scene results in full activation of
the correct schema.

Also,

I

have argued that the processing

of background information is obligatory until some criterion
of background identification has been reached.

Finally, it seems that the perceptual span for pictures
is large and that extrafoveal information plays an important

role in scene processing.

Moreover, the results of
97

Experiment

3

suggest that conceptual information from
the

background is integrated across saccades.
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APPENDIX
DESCRIPTIONS OF SCENES

Scene name in parentheses indicates scene
that was used for
background inconsistent conditions.

Indicates non-target object in all experiments
Indicates non-target object in Experiments 2
and

*

Scenes and Objects
1

.

Bedroom
(Refrigerator)
1.
2.
3.
4 .
5.

2.

Teddy Bear **
Doll
Suitcase
Cap
Pennent *

Broom Closet
(Desk)

Iron **
Scrub Brush
3
Paper Towels
4
Bucket
5. Wisk Broom *
1.
2 .
.
.

3.

Clothes Closet
(Oven)

Pants **
Bowtie *
3
Glove
4. Shoe
5. Hat
1.
2.
.

4.

Construction
(Porch)

Drill
Hammer **
3
Saw
4. Saw Horse
5. Ladder
1.
2.
.

*
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3

5.

Desk
(Broom Closet)

Briefcase
Lamp
Phone
Stapler **
Picture *

1.
2 •
3

.

4.
5.
6.

Diner
(Shower)

Cup
Fork
Salt **
4
Syrup
5. Ketchup
1.
2.
3.
.

7

.

*

Fireplace
(Laundry)
1.
2.
3.
4 .
5.

8

.

Candle
Chair **
Clock
Logs
Bellows *

Refrigerator
(Bedroom)
1.
2*
3

.

4.
5.
9

.

Butter
Cheese
Lettuce *
Milk
Onion **

Laundry
(Fireplace)
1.

2.
3

.

4.
5.

10.

Basket
Laundry Soap Box
Hanger
Shirt
Bleach **

*

Oven
(Clothes Closet)
1.
2.
3
4

.
.

5.

Pot
Spoon **
Teapot
Turkey
Oven Mit

*
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11-

Pool
(Street)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

12

.

*

Porch
(Construction)
12
3
4

.
.

.

5.

13.

Flipper
Raft
Grill
Ball **
Life Saver

Birdhouse **
Skate
Pumpkin
Newspaper
Watering Can

*

Kitchen Sink
(Toilet)
1.
2

.

3.
4.
5.

14

•

Coffee Maker
Eggbeater **
Toaster
Wine Glass
Dish Detergent

*

Shower
(Diner)
1.
2.
3
4

5

15

•

.
.

.

Bath Mat **
Slippers
Soap *
Towel
Shampoo

Street
(Pool)
1.
2.
3.
4

.

5.

16.

Bike
Fire Hydrant
Mailbox
Parking Meter
Wagon **

*

Toilet
(Kitchen Sink)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Toilet Brush **
Toilet Paper
Kleenex
Toilet Plunger
Baby Powder *
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